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Abstract 
 
If the presence of a union in a workplace or firm raises the pay level, unless productivity rises correspondingly, 
financial performance is likely to be worse.  If the product market is uncompetitive this might imply a simple 
transfer from capital to labour with no efficiency effects, but is probably more likely to lead to lower investment 
rates and economic senescence.  Therefore the impact of unions on productivity, financial performance and 
investment is extremely important.  This paper distils  evidence on such effects from six countries:  USA, 
Canada, UK, Germany, Japan and Australia. 
It is not possible to use theory to predict unambiguously any union effect on productivity because 
unions can both enhance and detract from the productivity performance of the workplace or firm.  The evidence 
indicates that, in the USA, workplaces with both high performance work systems and union recognition have 
higher labour productivity than other workplaces.  In the UK previous negative links between unions and labour 
productivity have been eroded by greater competition and more emphasis on “partnership” in industrial relations 
but there is a lingering negative effect of multi-unionism, just as there is in Australia.  In Germany the weight of 
the evidence sugges ts that the information, consultation and voice role of works councils enhances labour 
productivity particularly in larger firms.  In Japan unions also tend to raise labour productivity via the longer job 
tenures in union workplaces which makes it more attractive to invest in human capital and through the unpaid 
personnel manager role played by full-time enterprise union officials in the workplace. 
Unions will reduce profits if they raise pay and/or lower productivity.  The evidence is pretty clear cut:  
the bulk of studies show that profits or financial performance is inferior in unionised workplaces, firms and 
sectors than in their non-union counterparts.  But the world may be changing.  A recent study of small USA 
entrepreneurial firms found a positive association between unions and profits and in the UK the outlawing of the 
closed shop, coupled with a lower incidence of multi-unionism has contributed to greater union-management 
cooperation such that recent studies find no association between unions and profits.  North American and 
German evidence suggests that unionisation reduces investment by around one fifth compared with the 
investment rate in a non-union workplace.  In both Canada and the USA this effect is even felt at low levels of 
unionisation.  The UK evidence is mixed:  the most thorough study also finds that union recognition depresses 
investment, but this adverse effect is offset as density rises.  The exception is Japan where union recognition 
goes hand-in-hand with greater capital intensity. 
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1. Introduction:  the Issues and the Countries 
 
If the presence of a union in a workplace or firm boosts pay, financial performance is likely 
to be worse unless there is a roughly equivalent union effect on productivity.  Any such 
impact on profitability may lead to higher consumer prices and is likely to cause lower 
investment rates, contributing to economic senescence, although when the product market is 
monopolistic it might under some circumstances be benign – a simple transfer from capital to 
labour – with no efficiency implications. 
Productivity matters a lot:  increased productivity is the source of higher living 
standards for employees, more profits for capitalists and lower prices for consumers.  
Similarly investment in physical and human capital is a crucial source of economic 
dynamism at the level of the firm as well as for the aggregate economy.  Therefore the 
manner in which industrial relations institutions in general, and unions in particular, affect 
productivity, financial performance and investment is keenly important.  This chapter distils 
evidence on such effects from six countries:  USA and Canada from North America, UK and 
Germany from Europe and Japan and Australia from Australasia.  Most of the evidence 
comes from cross sections of workplaces or firms because there are rather few good recent 
case studies.  This is a pity because case studies of aircraft production (Kleiner et al. 2002) 
and tyre manufacturing (Krueger and Mas 2002), which combined detailed institutional 
knowledge with sophisticated statistical technique, probably epitomise the direction of future 
research. 
These six countries were chosen for two reasons.  First, the vast bulk of accessible 
studies analysing links between unionisation and productivity, investment and profits have 
been undertaken for these countries.  It would have been nice to include some LDCs or other 
evidence from Africa, Asia and southern Europe but little seems to exist.  Second, the system 
of industrial relations in these six countries varies greatly which, in principle, might be 
expected to lead to different union effects among the countries. 
Consider Table 1 which summarises the industrial relations systems on the basis of 
six indicators carefully constructed by OECD.  In the mid-1990s union density (row 1) in 
Canada, Australia and UK was over double that in the USA with Japan and Germany in 
between.  In the USA, Canada and Japan union density and coverage of collective barga ining 
rates (row 2) are much the same reflecting decentralised bargaining and high density 
achieved via mandatory dues check-off provisions where such bargaining occurs.  In the UK 
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more employees are covered by collective bargaining than are in unions because there are lots 
of free riders.  In Germany and Australia collective bargaining coverage is around three times 
as high as union density because bargains in unionised firms get extended (erga omnes) to 
non-union enterprises. 
The level of bargaining (row 3) and extent of coordination (row 4) also vary among 
the six countries.  In the mid-1990s bargaining was decentralised to firm level in the USA, 
Canada and Japan.  In Germany and Australia sector level bargaining predominated, although 
a move towards decentralisation is now apparent in both countries.  Even though bargaining 
is decentralised in Japan there is considerable coordination in bargaining strategy and tactics 
among both employers and unions (as there is in Germany), whereas there is much less 
coordination in the UK, USA and Canada although there is still some pattern bargaining in 
the auto and construction industries in North America. 
Employment regulation by the state varies greatly among the countries.  The mid-
1990s labour standard index – covering working time regulations, fixed term contracts, 
employment protection, minimum wage arrangements and employee representation rights 
ranges from 8 (out of 10) in Germany to 0 in the USA and UK.  The more specific 
employment protection “stickiness index” also demonstrates that regulations covering 
procedures, notice period, severance pay and rules for individual and collective dismissals are 
much more stringent in Germany and Japan than they are in the UK and USA. 
There is now a substantial cross-country literature examining links between such 
industrial relations institutions and macroeconomic performance and income distribution (see 
for example, successive annual issues of OECD, Employment Outlook).  It is plausible that 
particular bundles of characteristics among these institutions might also affect the 
performance of firms and workplaces.  In very broad terms, for our six countries, the USA, 
Canada and UK can be thought of as having low coverage, decentralised bargaining and 
weak labour standards, while Germany, Japan and Australia have high coverage (not Japan), 
less decentralised or more coordinated bargaining and stronger employment protection.  
There are, however, no automatic links with workplace performance.  For example, strong 
employment protection coupled with sector level bargaining might promote security and 
voice leading to information sharing and more investment in human capital, thereby boosting 
performance.  But equally decentralised bargaining with minimal standards might imply 
mutual gain negotiations at firm level, which could also enhance performance.  We shall just 
have to wait and see what the evidence suggests. 
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Some patterns do emerge.  Unions and works councils influence productivity 
modestly favourably in Japan and Germany respectively.  In the USA workplaces with both 
so-called high performance work (HPW) practices and union recognition attain superior 
productivity to workplaces with just recognition or just HPW practices.  And in each country 
more intense product market competition and the evolution of cooperative industrial relations 
has weakened any negative associations between unions and productivity and strengthened 
positive ones.  The vast weight of the evidence suggests that a union presence is associated 
with lower profitability but that the union impact is largely dependent on weak competition in 
the product market and the consequent surplus available for redistribution to employees.  
Unions appear also to lower the rate of investment in physical capital in the USA, UK and 
Germany – perhaps because of their impact on financial performance? – but to raise 
investment in human capital in the UK and USA. 
But such patterns must be treated cautiously.  First, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the findings even within countrie s.  For example one recent, possibly 
idiosyncratic, USA study of small entrepreneurial firms finds a strong positive link between 
unions and profits.  And in Germany the vital information, consultation and voice role played 
by works councils does not yield unambiguous findings on any of the three performance 
measures.  Second, “unions” are themselves heterogeneous.  It seems, for example, that 
enterprise unions and works councils have a more positive impact on performance than 
multiunionism and fragmented bargaining.  Third, links between unionisation and 
performance alter over time in response, for example, to greater competition 
(“globalisation”), less adversarial relations between management and labour and 
modifications to the legal environment in which unions operate. 
Studies in this area, including some in this survey, are sometimes incomplete.  
Insufficient attention is paid to product market – labour market links.  Nickell (2001) recently 
pointed out that “what unions do depends on what they can do, and this depends on the extent 
of product market competition”.  This link is given considerable prominence below.  Next, 
there is rather little on process.  Statistical studies typically relate institutions to outcomes but 
are silent on the how and why.  If, for example, unions raise productivity does this come 
about through better quality labour, greater job satisfaction, fewer quits, better work 
organisation or harder work?  Some complementary case studies are urgently needed.  
Replication is also useful.  The world moves on so any union impact in the more regulated 
UK labour market pre-Thatcher might not hold now.  Similarly bargaining is becoming more 
decentralised in Australia and Germany and this is bound to have an effect on the role and 
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power of unions.  As heterogeneity of outcomes increases with decentralised bargaining the 
need for firm level studies becomes even stronger. 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Union effects on productivity, financial 
performance and investment are set out in Sections 2-4 respectively.  In each case the 
relevant theory and methods of investigation are discussed followed by evidence.  We 
attempt to distil the weight of the evidence and provide an exemplary study for each country 
on each indicator, sometimes one with unexpected results.  Many issues require further 
analysis and Section 5 goes into a bit more detail on product market- labour market links, the 
evolution of more cooperative industrial relations and its impact, the effects of different union 
structures, unions ’ impact on investment in human capital, and the role of German works 
councils.  Summary and conclusions are set out in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Productivity 
 
a. Theory and testing 
 
Unions can influence industrial relations and personnel management for good or ill.  The 
union impact on things like apprenticeship methods, promotion policies, work organisation, 
wage levels and payments systems and grievance procedures will feed through into 
productivity.  It is impossible to determine a priori whether such a union effect will raise or 
lower the level of labour productivity.  Indeed, it is likely that productivity-enhancing union 
effects and productivity-detracting effects occur simultaneously, so the net effect must be a 
matter of careful empirical investigation.  In what follows, we set out the channels by which 
unions might lower or raise productivity and we emphasise the limitations of and caveats to 
the studies reviewed. 
 
Reasons why union presence may lower labour productivity 
 
Four sets of reasons why union presence may lower labour productivity are noted.  First, 
unions may be associated with restrictive work practices.  Second, industrial action may have 
an adverse impact.  Third, union firms may invest less than non-union firms.  Fourth, if 
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unions are associated with an adversarial style of industrial relations the consequent low trust 
and lack of cooperation between the parties may lower productivity. 
Restrictive work practices surely lower labour productivity.  Pencavel (1977) suggests 
that such practices result from “union malfeasance”.  Increased security from disagreeable 
management decisions is more possible for union than for non-union labour.  Such security 
may be formalised through work rules (job regulation) and unions may operate in a 
conventional cartel- like fashion by restricting output.  Such restrictive practices take a 
number of forms (see e.g. Donovan 1968, ch.6).  There may be work rules concerning, for 
example, pace or job demarcations.  Over-manning might result from fixed gang sizes or 
extensive use of assistants.  Capital may not be used intensively or might be poorly 
maintained.  Finally, there may be policy overtime i.e. a restriction on effort during normal 
hours in order to boost total pay via overtime working.  But the scope for such practices is 
limited in competitive markets because the firm may go out of business.  So we should expect 
such practices to be more prevalent in the public sector and in monopolistic product markets. 
Industrial action will lower output where it occurs, but that output might be made 
good over time or by other firms.  Such action, or the threat of it, causes uncertainty about 
output levels and this will tend to reduce the effectiveness of resources devoted to marketing 
and distribution; and company performance will be impaired if delivery dates are not met 
(Caves 1980).  If labour relations tend to deteriorate as plant size increases this might 
encourage companies to build plants smaller than would otherwise be indicated by technical 
economies of scale.  Finally management time is diverted to problems of labour relations and 
away from other tasks.  Particular care needs to be taken with the arrow of causation between 
industrial action and labour productivity.  It is quite plausible that poor labour productivity 
reflects poor management which also causes more industrial action. 
Unionised firms may invest less in capital equipment and research and development 
than non-union firms or the returns from such expenditure may be lower causing, in turn, less 
future investment (Grout 1984a, 1984b).  Shareholders and managers get locked into specific 
investments of plant and machinery and R&D.  They are therefore vulnerable to ex post 
exploitation by unions.  For example, capital may be kept idle because of disputes over 
manning levels.  This lowers the rate of return to the investment thus causing under-
investment.  Such arguments may hold with special force to more risky investments.  The 
impact of unions on investment is analysed in Section 4. 
Union presence may sometimes result in an adversarial style of industrial relations, 
lowering trust and cooperation.  If both parties strive for their own selfish ends they may both 
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end up worse off – in terms of labour productivity and real earnings – than if they cooperated 
(see Leibenstein 1988, ch.5 for an intuitive but formal discussion).  It is often forgotten that 
this point was made very forcibly by Freeman and Medoff (1984).  Their argument was that 
unions would raise productivity only under very strict circumstances:  “if industrial relations 
are good, with management and unions working together to produce a bigger “pie” as well as 
fighting over the size of the slices, productivity is likely to be higher under unionism.  If 
industrial relations are poor, with management and labour ignoring common goals to battle 
one another, productivity is likely to be lower under unionism”.  Any such productivity-
reducing effects of union presence may be compounded if multi-unionism is present in the 
organisation. 
 
Reasons why union presence may raise labour productivity 
 
Five sets of reasons why labour productivity may be higher in the presence of unions are 
discussed.  First, firms’ responses to union relative wage effects may result in higher labour 
productivity, but this should not be interpreted as raising the welfare of society.  Second, 
unions may play a monitoring role on behalf of the employer.  Third, the familiar collective 
voice arguments may have favourable consequences.  Fourth, it is sometimes held that a 
union presence may make managers less lethargic.  Finally, unions should stop exploitation 
of labour, resulting in improved productivity. 
If unions achieve a wage differential over non-union workers firms respond by 
increasing the capital intensity of production and employing better qua lity labour, both of 
which raise labour productivity.  But this route to higher productivity needs careful 
interpretation.  We do not want productivity to rise because of wage push:  it is not in 
societies’ interest if unions raise wages and productivity rises because firms respond by 
substituting capital for labour- lowering employment – and raising prices to consumers.  
Rather, it is the other union routes to higher productivity like monitoring and collective voice 
which truly raise welfare. 
Pencavel (1977) emphasises the important role played by unions in monitoring work.  
His arguments are related to, and anticipated, the voice and agency arguments considered 
below:  “the trade union may be interpreted as the employees’ auditor of management 
checking that the employer is fulfilling his part of the labour contract.  Or when the union is 
given a role overseeing work performance and in disseminating wage payments to workers, 
its officials become the monitors of the employees.  The degree to which these monitoring 
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activities achieve a close association between productivity and rewards will determine the 
efficiency of the organisation”.  Donovan’s (1968) classic study of UK shop stewards 
confirmed such functions.  It emphasised the shop stewards’ role in communication, 
information and discipline and described shop stewards as lubricants rather than irritants.  
Although the employer does not have to operate through the union Pencavel points out that 
because the shop steward is drawn from the ranks of the workers, employees will be less 
suspicious when work operation rules are altered and there may be greater cooperation 
between labour and capital.  Thus labour productivity may be raised because craft unions 
enforce standards of workmanship, and all unions may seek to prevent malingering and 
shirking by individuals.  This favourable productivity effect may, however, be offset by the 
greater role now played by unions in supporting members at both internal grievance hearings 
and at Labour Courts. 
The collective voice provided by a union may improve efficiency within the firm.  
First, collective voice is an information source on worker preferences which should result in 
an effective mix of wages and personnel policies.  For example there is the standard public 
good (i.e. non-rival consumption) argument for collective voice to achieve the right level of 
health and safety provision.  Without such a voice it will be underprovided.  Second, the 
collective voice may improve morale, motivation and cooperation.  For example, firm 
specific skills learned on the job require cooperation and this may be forthcoming if unions 
lessen rivalry among individuals.  Likewise, unions may provide greater security against 
arbitrary decisions on matters like dismissal or redundancy.  Thus teamwork may be 
enhanced.  Third, the voice may improve communications leading directly to better plant 
layout or improved working practices – a gain in x-efficiency.  Fourth, better grievance 
procedures may result.  Fifth, voice may provide a mechanism to improve the employment 
contract, encouraging or discouraging, for example, performance related pay or a less rigid 
workweek.  These collective voice arguments are the centrepiece of the Harvard School 
approach to the possibility that unions may raise productivity.  However, it is unclear why a 
union is required.  A works council or some other form of consultative arrangement might do 
just as well.  The consequences that flow from such collective voice will, in turn, also tend to 
raise labour productivity.  Labour turnover should be reduced (over and above any lower 
labour turnover resulting from higher union pay).  This leads to lower costs and higher 
returns to training and hence to greater accumulation of human capital and a more skilled 
workforce.  Further, recruitment costs and interruption of work should both be lessened as a 
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result of lower turnover.  Similar arguments hold if voice also results in less absenteeism and 
greater job satisfaction. 
Union presence may be associated with a shock to management and therefore to 
improvements in the management of labour.  There are two strands to this argument, which 
tend to get conflated.  First, there may be an impact effect of unionisation.  When a union 
initially gets recognised a firm might put better managers or equipment in place (it is a moot 
point as to how long the shock effect lasts and whether this argument is symmetrical when 
unions get de-recognised).  Second, there is held to be a continuing effect:  “managerial 
responses to unionism that take the form of more rational personnel policies and more careful 
monitoring of work raise productivity by reducing organisational slack” (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984).  These two potential positive effects of unionisation on labour productivity 
may spillover to non-union firms, which may be kept on their toes in their attempts to keep 
unions out. 
Finally, unions may counter unfair bargaining power on the employer’s side.  If 
unions stop exploitation of labour by raising wages this is socially desirable.  The firm will, 
in turn, respond by raising the capital intensity of production, resulting in improved labour 
productivity. 
 
Union presence and changes in productivity 
 
Union presence can influence the level of labour productivity for good or ill, so unionisation 
can also be associated with differentiated changes in labour productivity.  If any of the 
productivity-enhancing channels discussed above, like voice, are strengthened or if restrictive 
practices and the like which are harmful to labour productivity are weakened, union presence 
will be associated with improved performance relative to the non-union sector.  These 
dynamic forces are obviously important because the manner in which union(s) interact with 
management or influence investment will vary over time.  For example, if managerial 
practices become more effective or the industrial relations climate more cooperative in unions 
firms, then union presence will be associated with faster growth than before.  Similarly, if 
previously the union sector invested less than the non-union sector or lagged in the adoption 
of new techniques, but now invests more, we would expect to see an improvement in the 
relative performance of the union sector.  It is most unlikely that heavily unionised 
workplaces or industries can have permanently higher or lower productivity growth than 
corresponding less- or non-unionised organisations.  This would imply an ever-widening gap 
 9
between the two groups, which is most implausible.  Thus findings for the one decade should 
not, for example, be extrapolated to the next. 
 
Limitations and caveats 
 
Pencavel (1991) notes that the ideal data to examine the net effect of unionisation on 
productivity require:  a single industry, making the assumption of a common technology 
among plants more plausible; a physical measure of output so as not to conflate price and 
quantity effects; longitudinal information for each plant; a change of union status for some 
plants during the period such as the granting of union recognition.  A fruitful sector for such 
analysis is British docks where Evans et al. (1993) analysed productivity change in docks 
previously covered by the National Dock Labour Scheme, relative to non-Scheme ports, 
consequent on the abolition of the Scheme in 1989. 
In the event, few of the studies reviewed below meet these stringent criteria.  
Therefore the limitations of the studies, and the caveats, must both be spelled out.  These 
include the neglect of management, the lack of a theory of union behaviour, disregard of 
underlying industrial relations, failure to deal with the heterogeneity of unions and the 
structure of collective bargaining, the fact that the studies are time-specific, and emphasis on 
outcomes at the expense of processes; various measurement problems, the lack of appropriate 
control variables, the nature of the sample, the nature of the causal mechanisms, and the fact 
that there is great variation around average “union effects”. 
It takes two to tango.  Any impact of unions on productivity must reflect the way in 
which management and unions interact.  Indeed the very decision to recognise unions “may 
form part of a cluster of characteristics whose effects warrant study” (Edwards 1987).  
Further, the underlying model of union behaviour is seldom fully set out.  This is a pity 
because predictions concerning the strength and direction of union productivity effects vary 
according to the preferred model of union behaviour.  The monopoly model, for example, has 
different implications concerning productivity and profits to the efficient bargaining model. 
Harvard School writers do not claim that unions mechanistically raise labour 
productivity.  They state explicitly that this will only happen if, hand-in-hand with union 
recognition, there is a non-adversarial industrial relations system and competition in the 
product market.  In Great Britain in the 1960s and 1970s unions were fragmented, there was 
considerable strength at shop floor level, manufacturing had overall high density and, till 
recently, a considerable public sector presence.  Perhaps therefore we might expect a less 
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favourable impact of unions on labour productivity in the UK at that time than (say) in the 
US or Germany.  And now that UK unions emphasise cooperation and partnership any union 
impact should have become more favourable than previously. 
Unions are not homogeneous but unfortunately in many studies “unionism remains an 
abstraction:  one union is like every other union, one collective bargaining relationship is like 
all the rest” (Lipsky 1985).  There is little attempt to capture the various forms of unionism 
and collective bargaining.  Two examples will suffice.  First, craft unions may have different 
consequences than general or industrial unions because craft unions have more scope for 
restrictive practices and are more likely to impose constraints on the growth of productivity 
since they will evade many of the costs associated with their protection of particular 
occupational interests and job territories.  By contrast, an industrial union may be less likely 
to block technical change because a smaller proportion of its membership is displaced.  
Second, the structure of collective bargaining may also influence productivity outcomes.  For 
example, multi-unionism will tend to both enlarge the number of bargaining units and 
increase the uncertainty inherent in the bargaining process.  This could, in turn, lower labour 
productivity via strike activity or by in-fighting among sectional groups.  The studies of the 
association between unions and productivity are time specific.  The world moves on so any 
association found for the 1980s does not automatically hold in the new millennium. 
Statistical analyses deal with outcomes.  Case studies are a vital complement because 
they illuminate the processes by which unions influence productivity at the workplace level.  
Such case studies might incorporate (Lipsky 1985) the history of the parties and their 
relationships; the customs and traditions of the worksite; the personalities, attitudes and 
leadership skills of the actors; negotiating tactics used by the parties; the degree of inter- and 
intra-organisational conflict; and the availability of various dispute resolution procedures. 
Measurement problems bedevil many studies.  Ideally labour productivity should be 
measured by a physical measure of output like tons of coal per man-shift.  But as firms and 
industries make different things value added per employee is often used.  If gross value added 
per employee is used then it is necessary to control for both differences in the capital 
equipment and in bought-in inputs, which also contribute to value added.  But this is only the 
beginning.  Net value added per employee is the result of both quantity and price effects.  
There is always the danger that what is measured as higher productivity is in fact attributable 
to a higher price in that firm or industry.  Alternatively, the existence of a union wage 
mark-up may cause higher costs and this, in turn, may induce higher prices – which show up 
as an apparently higher productivity level.  More recently, some stud ies have sidestepped 
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these issues by measuring productivity on a 5-point ordinal scale comparing the workplace 
with other similar workplaces in the same industry.  Union presence has also been measured 
in different ways.  Recognition, density or the existence of a closed shop seems 
unproblematic.  But the coverage of collective agreements used by some authors is not the 
same as unionisation and may be inappropriate to capture the influence of union presence on 
labour productivity. 
Selection of the sample presents problems too.  For example inefficient firms might 
get selected out of the sample.  Or unions might select inherently more productive firms to 
unionise.  Appropriate control variables are vital to get at the true association between unions 
and productivity.  The life cycle of plants raises particular difficulties.  A negative association 
between union presence and productivity is spurious if it just happens that, by coincidence, 
unions are over represented in “declining” workplaces and industries which also have lower 
productivity.  Ideally, the vintage of the workplace should be incorporated as a control.  The 
studies of union impact on productivity often present an average union effect.  But there is 
great variation around the average.  The richness in the variety of union practices in 
enhancing or discouraging labour productivity, particularly concerning their interaction with 
management, is not always captured by these statistical studies.  Finally, the arrow of 
causation must be examined carefully.  An association does not necessarily imply causation 
and, anyway, causation might sometimes go “the other way”.  For example a well-organised 
workplace would tend to have high productivity and low strikes, producing a negative 
relationship between the two.  But, in this case, the lower strike activity is not the cause of the 
higher productivity. 
 
b. Evidence 
 
On the basis of the discussion above it might be expected that unions would have a positive 
impact on productivity in the USA – consequent on the substantial union wage premium – 
and in Germany and Japan because of voice and cooperative industrial relations achieved 
through works councils and enterprise unions.  By contrast, at least until recently, adversarial 
industrial relations and multi-unionism in the UK and Australia made a negative link more 
likely.  In all countries it would be expected that more intense product market competition 
and moves away from antagonistic relations between management and labour towards a 
mutual gain system would lessen adverse union effects and enhance positive ones.  Those 
wanting a thorough trawl of studies on unions and productivity should consult Doucouliagos 
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and Laroche (2000) who provide evidence on some 100 studies but end up emphasising how 
the findings are country, time and sector specific. 
In their very careful recent study of US unions, working practices and labour 
productivity, Black and Lynch (1997) note that “empirically, the evidence on the impact of 
unions on productivity is mixed”.  They state that most empirical work has looked at industry 
level productivity and union density data or industry-specific studies:  “The range of 
estimates on the impact of unions on labour productivity runs from minus 3% in Clark (1984) 
to plus 22% in Brown and Medoff (1978) to no effect in Freeman and Medoff (1984)”.  
Further any effects may vary by sector.  For example Bronars et al. (1994) state that unions 
are associated with higher relative productivity levels in manufacturing and lower 
productivity in non-manufacturing.   
Black and Lynch (see Table 2) try and reconcile these disparate findings by interacting 
the union status of the establishment with other workplace practices.  Essentially the aim is to 
distinguish between different types of labour-management relations – traditional and new – 
and their impact on labour productivity.  This seems a very useful approach because the focus 
of much recent research concerns not unions and productivity but high performance work 
practices and productivity (see e.g. Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) and Huselid and Becker 
(1996) who calculate a detailed HRM index and analyse how changes in this index influence 
the performance of the firm). 
The sample is over 600 manufacturing workplaces in 1993 (a panel study from 1987-
1993 yield very similar results).  Black and Lynch construct a base case benchmark 
workplace which is a non-union multi-establishment plant, has profit sharing for managers 
but not for non-managers, no TQM, no benchmarking, 1% of employees meeting regularly 
about work issues, 10% of non-managerial employees using computers, 1% of employees in 
self managed teams and mean values for age of equipment, education levels, turnover, and 
number of employees per supervisor.  They then alter the characteristics of this benchmark to 
see how labour productivity changes: 
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 change in productivity 
cf base case (%) 
unionised, no employee involvement 
HPW systems, non-union 
HPW systems, union 
 
-15 
+11 
+20 
 
Thus an old fashioned plant with union recognition but no employee involvement does 15% 
worse than the base case.  Introducing high performance work systems (HPW systems) has a 
large and positive effect on productivity.  The HPW system plant has 50% of non-managers 
using computers, 50% of workers meeting to discuss workplace issues regularly, profit 
sharing for non-managers, 30% of workers in self-managed teams, TQM and benchmarking.  
And if the plant has all these HPW practices and is unionised, productivity increases 20 
percentage points above the base case.  Thus for US manufacturing at least, “unionised firms 
who have succeeded in moving to a more cooperative labor management relations system 
which gives employees more voice in decision making but at the same time links their 
compensation with performance have higher labor productivity”.  Cappelli and Neumark 
(2001) note that HPW practices raise employee compensation as well as productivity.  This is 
consistent with the Black and Lynch study but causes them to emphasise an alternative 
conclusion, namely “HPW practices have little effect on overall labor efficiency measured as 
output per dollar spent on labour”.  Links between unionisation and various employee 
involvement work/practices are discussed further in Section 5. 
Most studies of unions’ impact on performance compare performance (say productivity) 
among otherwise similar firms or workplaces that differ according to union status.  An 
ingenious alternative approach (Pencavel 2001) compares productivity according to the 
governance of the firm.  The plywood mills in Washington state are of three types:  classical 
text book (non-union) mills, traditional unionised mills and cooperative mills owned and 
managed by the workers.  When he compares total factor productivity between cooperative 
mills and unionised mills Pencavel finds that productivity is 14% higher in the former.  It is 
suggested that the higher coop productivity reflects greater industriousness and lower levels 
of supervision in cooperative mills than in unionised mills.  This seems consistent with the 
Black and Lynch study where unionised workplaces with high performance work practices 
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such as voice and self-managed teams had higher productivity than more traditional 
unionised workplaces like the unionised plywood mills. 
Labour economists are going “inside the firm” more frequently now than in the past.  
This research method, which blends detailed knowledge of the operation of the firm with 
modern statistical technique, has yielded two marvellous case studies on the subject of unions 
and productivity.  These explorations overcome many of the problems associated with the 
cross section studies noted above.  The first deals with the impact of industrial relations 
variables on productivity at “Big Plane”, the largest US plane manufacturer.  The second 
shows the dire impact of a major strike on product quality at a tyre firm. 
Big Plane [Boeing] is the largest manufacturing exporter and the second largest 
manufacturing employer in the US.  Kleiner et al. (2002) analyse 18 years (1974-1991) of 
monthly production data to assess the impact of three strikes, a 10-month long work to rule, 
the nature of union leadership inside the firm and the introduction of TQM on productivity.  
They find:  “strikes, slowdowns and union leaders influenced the productivity of this plant by 
large percentages and large absolute dollar amounts [but] did not have long term productivity 
effects, the firm was able to return to pre-event levels of production within one to four 
months”.  Further, introducing TQM into a low trust industrial relations environment reduced 
labour productivity and increased labour costs; rather productivity was restored when TQM 
was abandoned after two years and the previous heavy monitoring authoritarian governance 
system reintroduced. 
Product quality is affected by industrial relations but this link has been little studied.  
A skilful analysis (Krueger and Mas 2002) of the consequences of a major dispute which 
lasted over 2 years (1994-96) at the Bridgestone/Firestone tyre plant at Decatur, IL, examines 
this issue.  It is coupled with the recall of 14.4 million tyres by Ford and Firestone and 
Firestone tyres were linked to 271 fatalities and 800 injuries at the time of and immediately 
after the dispute.  The previous contract expired in April 1994 and employees worked without 
a contract for 3 months prior to going on strike.  In negotiations Bridgestone/Firestone 
demanded a move from 8 hour to 12 hour shifts, as well as cutting pay for new hires by 30 
percent.  Almost immediately after the 4200 workers went on strike the company began to 
hire replacement workers.  Krueger and Mas state that the strike could have led to poor 
product quality in a number of ways.  The replacement workers might have been under-
trained.  Lax supervision during the strike could have contributed to tyre defects.  Discord 
among replacement workers, union members who crossed the picket line and returning 
strikers could have resulted in production defects.  And workers may have been fatigued and 
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more prone to errors because Firestone introduced a 12-hour, rotating shift to operate the 
plant 24 hours a day during the strike. 
The evidence assembled strongly “suggests that the strike and strife in Decatur was a 
major contributing factor to the production of defective tires”.  For example the analysis finds 
an excess number of complaints for tyres produced at Decatur in the few months before the 
strike began, when Bridgestone/Firestone demanded concessions, and in the period when 
many replacement workers and recalled union members worked side by side.  It is not simply 
that under-trained or poorly supervised replacement workers produced defective tyres.  
Instead, the timing suggests that the concurrence of replacement workers and union members 
working side by side before the contract was settled, as well as labour strife in the months 
leading up to the strike, coincided with a high number of defective tyres.  The stock market 
valuation of Bridgestone/Firestone more than halved from $16.7 billion to $7.5 billion in the 
four months after the recall was announced.  Further, the authors estimate that more than 40 
lives were lost as a result of the excessive number of problem tyres produced in Decatur 
during the dispute.  It is hard to disagree with the authors understated conclusion that “this 
episode serves as a useful reminder that a good relationship between labour and management 
can be in the company’s interest”. 
Analysis of the impact of unions on productivity in Canada used a time series from 
1926-78 (Maki 1983) covering the whole economy except for agriculture.  The author 
calcula tes that the growth in union density during the 1970s reduced the annual growth in 
total factor productivity by 1.7% per year and the increase in strike activity had a 
corresponding reduction of 1.0% per year.  These seem remarkably large effects. 
Links between the industrial relations regime in a company or workplace and its 
productivity performance have long been a matter of interest and debate in the UK.  The state 
of play in the 1970s and 1980s was surveyed by Metcalf (1990b).  The focus of the studies of 
that period was manufacturing industry where “the weight of the evidence suggests that 
around 1980 union presence was associated with lower levels of labour productivity, but that 
in the first half of the 1980s strongly unionised workplaces and industries had faster growth 
in labour productivity than their non-union counterparts”.  This turnaround in the productivity 
performance of the highly-unionised manufacturing sector was examined by Metcalf (1990a).  
Britain went from being bottom of the league table of productivity growth in the G-7 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s to top in the 1980s (and near top in the 1990s).  This was 
attributed to the interaction of more intense product market competition, higher levels of 
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unemployment and the legislative ons laught against organised labour which altered 
management and labour practices in favour of higher productivity. 
Recently, attention has concentrated on any lingering effects of multiple unionism and 
possible links between tougher product market competition and improved productivity 
performance.  Multi-unionism (i.e. more than one union in a workplace) was an important 
feature of British industrial relations.  For example in 1980 41% of establishments employing 
2000 people or more had 3-5 unions present and a further 38% had 6 or more present.  
Although there are only a small number of such plants they account for a large fraction of 
total employment.  Oulton (1995) states that up till the 1980s the UK system of industrial 
relations required, particularly in large plants, “that several different unions had to be able to 
reach agreement with management on changes in working methods.  If they could not agree, 
the status quo continued.  The costs of change, in terms of management time or interruptions 
to production, were high and the probability of no agreement at the end of the day was not 
negligible.  It seems very likely that the greater the number of partners to a negotiation, each 
with the power of veto, the lower is the probability of agreement.  Common sense suggests 
that change is likely to occur at a slower pace than in systems not suffering from these 
handicaps”.  This was precisely the position of Bean and Crafts (1996) who concluded that 
the decline in multi-unionism was central to the improvement in labour productivity in the 
1980s. 
Two questions flow from the discussion so far.  First, is there any longer any 
difference in productivity performance between workplaces which do and do not recognise a 
union?  Second, do multi-union workplaces perform worse than single union workplaces and 
can any such disadvantages be offset if the separate unions bargain jointly?  Pencavel (2002) 
investigates these issues (Table 2).  His sample is drawn from WERS98 and uses the 
subjective productivity measure where the manager compares his/her productivity 
performance with other workplaces in the same industry on a 5-point scale.  The sample size 
was 1484 of which 322 were single union workplaces, 337 were multi-union with joint 
bargaining, 228 were multi-union with separate bargaining and 597 were non-union.  The 
control variables were percentage of labour force part-time, percentage female, and 
workplace size and age.  The results are clear-cut.  There is no difference in the productivity 
performance of union compared with non-union workplaces.  But multi-unionism with 
fragmented bargaining still puts the workplace at a disadvantage.  Pencavel concludes:  “By 
the end of the 1990s, average union-non-union differences in labour productivity appear to be 
negligible.  Where such differences emerge, they are in establishments where fragmented 
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bargaining occurs.  Such bargaining is unusual – approximately only 7% of workplaces in 
1998 were characterised by fragmented bargaining.  This allows the generalisation that 
unionism may serve as an agent permitting employees to participate in shaping their work 
environment without productivity suffering”.  There is one important caveat to Pencavel’s 
conclusion, discussed further in Section 5, which demonstrates a remarkable difference in the 
link between unions and productivity when we compare monopolistic and competitive 
workplaces.   
The German industrial relations system has a dual structure of employee 
representation.  Collective agreements are negotiated between trade unions and employers’ 
associations at industry level, while works councils watch the implementation and 
coordination of such agreements at workplace level.  Some studies of links between 
employee representation and firm performance focus on works councils while others examine 
the union impact.   
Consider first the associations between works councils and productivity.  In her 
survey Schedlitzki (2002) states that three out of four recent studies found a positive link 
between the two variables, but only one of them reported this link to be statistically 
significant for the whole sample (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2001).  Due to their role as 
the main body for collective voice and employee involvement at the plant level, works 
councils might be expected to have quite a sizeable effect on the behaviour of employees and 
hence on their productivity.  This potential impact is strengthened by the extensive set of 
rights formally prescribed to works councils by the Works Constitution Act 1972.  For 
example, works councils have to be informed/consulted about redundancies and the 
introduction of new work methods.  Further, they have co-determination rights regarding 
social matters such as the regulation of overtime, changes in working hours, remuneration 
arrangements, the introduction of technical devices to monitor employee performance. 
Theoretically the link between works councils and labour productivity could be either, 
positive or negative (Addison, Kraft and Wagner 1993).  Works councils could use their 
rights in order to facilitate the flow of information and the introduction of new technology as 
suggested by Freeman and Medoff’s ‘collective voice’ model.  On the other hand, they could 
use their veto rights so as to delay important decisions on employment, technology and work 
organisation issues.  Any such negative impact that works councils might have on labour 
productivity might also occur via the ‘managerial competence’ hypothesis of FitzRoy and 
Kraft (1987).  They argued, that ‘most competent managers typically devote much attention 
to personnel matters, and presumably will establish effective communication and 
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participation without the imposition of any formal institutions or regulations’.  Consequently, 
they hypothesise that works councils impose legal constraints on the interna l organisation of 
a company and so reduce the efficiency of competent managers. 
A recent exemplary study measuring the link between works councils and 
productivity (Addison et al. 2000) used data from the Hannover Firmenpanel wave in 1994, 
from 1,025 manufacturing plants in Lower Saxony.  Productivity was measured by value 
added per employee and a dummy variable captures works council presence.  Numerous 
controls were included in this study such as human capital, establishment size and age, the 
state of technology, the degree of market power, capacity utilization and profit-sharing 
schemes for employees and for management.  The authors also controlled for several work 
organisation and industry variables.  The findings showed a statistically significant posit ive 
link between works councils and labour productivity only for large establishments with 101-
1000 employees.  For smaller establishments with 21-100 employees the link was positive 
but statistically insignificant.  The authors speculate that the German mandatory works 
councils ‘might set too high a level of employee involvement for smaller establishments and 
might better accord with the needs of larger plants in this regard’.  They conclude, that the 
differentiation between large and small establishments provided by the Works Constitution 
Act 1972 is insufficient. 
Links between German trade unions and labour productivity have not been studied as 
much as the impact of works councils.  The most thorough study (Addison, Genosko and 
Schnabel 1989) is a cross-section analysis of 30 German industries organised by trade unions 
in 1983.  The authors found a negative but statistically insignificant link between trade unions 
and labour productivity.  Schnabel (1991) confirms that “trade union density seems to exert a 
negative, but quantitatively small, influence on labour productivity” in his survey of five 
German studies. 
Increased international competition and moves towards decentralised bargaining have 
affected the German industrial relations systems recently (Hassel 1999).  Therefore, the 
above findings might not be representative any longer and more up to date studies are needed 
before a firm conclusion can be drawn on the relationship between works councils, unions 
and labour productivity. 
Initial studies of the link between union recognition and labour productivity for Japan 
showed mixed results.  Brunello (1992) suggested negative union effects but this finding was 
contradicted by Muramatsu (1984) and Morishima (1991).  Fortunately the two most recent 
studies reach more consistent conclusions.  It might be expected that enterprise unions – the 
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norm in Japan – would be likely to enhance efficiency in the workplace or company but 
neither study shows this directly.  Rather it is by subtle, indirect, channels – via longer 
tenures and the role of full- time union officials – that unions raise productivity.  Tachibanaki 
and Noda (2000) analyse data from a panel of 404 listed manufacturing firms 1992-1995 of 
which 350 recognise unions and 54 do not.  Productivity is measured as value added per 
employee and the controls include firm size, the capital:labour ratio, average job tenure, 
average age, fraction female and the age of the workplace.  Union recognition is negatively 
(significantly) associated with productivity but the union/tenure interaction has a positive 
effect.  Tenure is longer in unionised firms and once tenure is above 15 years (which it is in 
two thirds of their sample) the union effect becomes positive overall.  They summarise their 
findings as follows:  “The larger the share of employees with longer tenures, the higher the 
productivity of a firm.  Longer job tenures imply that they are highly experienced and skilled 
workers.  A labour union lowers separations and thus consolidates cooperative behaviour.  
Such cooperative behaviour in unionised firms raises employees’ work incentives, skill 
formation and possibly solidarity, and their loyalty to the firm as well as mutual trust”. 
Benson (1994) also finds no direct significant link between recognition and 
productivity but notes an important role for full-time union officials (see Table 2).  The 
sample is 253 manufacturing firms employing 100+ employees in the Kansai region.  
Productivity is measured subjectively by comparing it with other firms in the same indus try.  
Three indicators of unions are used:  recognition, density and the presence of a full-time 
union official at the company.  Various enterprise, workforce, management, industrial 
relations and product market characteristics are used as controls.  Firms with a full-time 
union official(s) have slightly higher levels of productivity than their non-union counterparts.  
This is because “full-time local union officials are more likely to enforce agreements and 
contracts relating to working conditions.  They may assist management in creating a more 
efficient and productive working environment.  Their intimate knowledge of the enterprise 
often means that management relies heavily on them to solve disputes, to contribute to the 
smooth running of the organisation and to assist in the effective management of human 
resources”. 
These two studies therefore suggest little or no direct impact of unions on 
productivity.  Rather, any effects (modestly positive) come via lengthening tenures which 
may enhance cooperation and the role of the full-time official which Benson describes as “an 
unpaid personnel manager”.  It would be interesting to know whether similar productivity-
enhancing effects of unions occur in other countries too. 
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Compared with Japan and Germany, Australia probably has a less cooperative 
tradition of labour relations, partly influenced by multi-unionism.  This resulted, according to 
the first Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS), in union presence being 
associated with lower labour produc tivity, but the impact of unions was rather small.  Drago 
and Wooden (1992) conclude in their comprehensive survey that the “net effect of unions on 
productivity in Australia does indeed appear to be negative . . . to the extent that multiple 
unionism is associated with poorer outcomes for profits, costs and productivity it follows that 
single union workplaces will perform better than the average workplace (which, in this 
sample, has about 2.5 unions)”. 
The detailed study of Crockett et al. (1992) analysed data from 759 private sector 
workplaces employing 20+ people from the 1991 AWIRS.  Productivity was measured on the 
subjective 5-point scale comparing the respondent’s workplace with other workplaces in the 
same industry.  Three indicators of unionisation were used – recognition, density and the 
number of unions (to examine the effect of multi-unionism).  Various workplace, workforce, 
labour relations and product market controls were included.  It is concluded that “trade 
unions are associated with lower relative productivity in the Australian labour market” and 
each union indicator has a negative sign and is significant at 10% or better.  But the effect of 
density itself is small.  Rather, “the negative union effect is strongest when unionism is 
measured by the number of unions.  Where there are several unions present, the detrimental 
effect on productivity is greater than if the workplace had a single union.  The presence of a 
number of unions presumably causes demarcation problems, inter-union competition and 
communication problems and may be associated with possible conflicts between different 
union voices”.  Thus evidence from both the UK and Australia points to an adverse link 
between multiunionism and productivity. 
 
c. Summary 
 
Rising living standards for employees, higher profits for capitalists and lower consumer 
prices flow, in the long run, from the growth in productivity.  Therefore links between 
industrial relations institutions and processes and the level and growth of productivity are 
profoundly important.  It is not possible to use theory to predict unambiguously any union 
effect on productivity because unions can both enhance and detract from the productivity 
performance of the workplace or firm.  Union presence may lower labour productivity via 
restrictive work practices, industrial action, causing the firm to invest less and if adversarial 
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industrial relations lowers trust and cooperation.  Alternatively labour productivity may be 
higher in the presence of a union if unions may play a monitoring role on behalf of the 
employer; collective voice provided by the union may have favourable consequences; unions 
may make managers less lethargic; and unions stop exploitation of labour, resulting in 
improved productivity. 
Testing for links between union presence and productivity is tricky.  The ideal data 
require a single industry, making the assumption of a common technology among workplaces 
more plausible; a physical measure of output so as not to conflate price and quantity effects; 
longitudinal information for each plant; and a change of union status for some plants during 
the period.  In the event many studies have limitations including a neglect of the role of 
management, lack of a theory of union behaviour and insufficient attention to the 
heterogeneity of unions and the measure of productivity. 
Results from six countries were set out.  On the basis of the discussion it might have 
been expected that unions would have a positive impact on productivity in the US – 
consequent on the large union wage premium – and in Germany and Japan via voice and 
cooperative industrial relations achieved through works councils and enterprise unions.  By 
contrast, until recently, adversarial industrial relations and multi-unionism in the UK and 
Australia made a negative link more likely.  In all countries more intense product market 
competition and moves towards mutual gains employee-management relations would be 
predicted to weaken any adverse union effects. 
By and large these expectations are borne out.  In the US workplaces with both high 
performance work systems and union recognition have higher labour productivity than other 
workplaces.  And a case study of bitter adversarial industrial relations at a tyre plant showed 
what a dreadful effect this had on the quality of the product.  In the UK previous negative 
links between unions and labour productivity have been eroded by greater competition and 
more emphasis on “partnership” in industrial relations.  There is a lingering negative effect of 
multi-unionism, just as there is in Australia.  In Germany the weight of the evidence (but not 
all of it) suggests that the information, consultation and voice role of works councils 
enhances labour productivity particularly in larger firms.  Finally, in Japan unions also tend to 
raise labour productivity via the longer job tenures in union workplaces which makes it more 
attractive to invest in human capital and through the unpaid personnel manager role played by 
full-time enterprise union officials in the workplace. 
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3. Financial Performance 
 
The impact of unions on profitability or financial performance flows from any impact union 
recognition has on pay levels and productivity.  If union presence boosts pay, financial 
performance will be worse unless there is a roughly equivalent union effect on productivity.  
The weight of the evidence reviewed here, focussing on the private sector, suggests a 
negative link between unionisation and financial performance.  But this association is much 
weaker when product markets are competitive rather than oligopolistic and industrial 
relations are cooperative not adversarial. 
 
a. Theory and testing 
 
If unions raise the level of wages without similarly increasing productivity the resources 
underpinning the higher pay level have to come from somewhere.  Such union wage gains 
might come from lower wages for non-union workers; or from consumers via higher product 
prices; or from the owners of capital via lower profits.  As Hirsch and Addison (1986) point 
out each of these routes is circumscribed by competition.  Large wage differentials between 
similar union and non-union workers tend to be partially eroded by selective hiring, threat 
effects raising wages in the non-union sector and cost advantages enjoyed by non-union 
firms.  Cost increases cannot easily be passed through to consumers in the form of higher 
prices unless a union has organised an entire industry or local market where exclusion of 
foreign and non-union competition is possible.  And in many sectors competition in the 
product market will limit surplus profits as a source of wage gains.  Therefore any union 
gains from potential firm profits turn largely on the existence of above-normal profits 
resulting from market power, government regulation, returns from fixed capital and firm-
specific advantages like location and R&D returns.  These channels will be briefly considered 
in turn. 
Links between the product market and labour market are the key to the market power 
channel.  In the short run if the firm has some monopoly power in the product market, unions 
may be able to raise wages and capture a share of the economic profits associated with 
market power.  Such a firm with market power will try to pass some of the wage push onto 
consumers but not all of it can be passed on in this way.  In the simplest case, when the firm 
remains on its demand curve, the union jacks up wages and the monopolist cuts back on 
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employment and simultaneously raises prices to consumers.  This is not a simple reallocation 
of income from the firm to the union; this is a case where part of the union wage gains come 
out of monopoly profits, but a part are paid for by the vulnerable consumer, with possible 
consequences for future jobs and investment.  There is an alternative, but special – and 
probably atypical – case where the union maximises rents and negotiates efficient contracts 
(see Pencavel 1991).  In such circumstances the income redistribution is benign – a simple 
transfer from capital to labour – and has no long run consequences for investment and 
employment.  The simple notion that there is a fixed level of profit some of which the unions 
may capture without any subsequent consequences is not correct except in this special case.  
Normally the monopoly firm will try to defend its profit and take corrective action by getting 
consumers to pay more.  The end result is lower profits for the firm, but not as low as if it did 
not raise its prices. 
Many sectors are or were previously either in state hands (nationalised industries) or 
regulated such that entry and price competition were simultaneously limited.  This again 
creates a potential pot of economic profit that may be captured in part by labour.  For 
example, in the US this happened in trucking and the airlines.  In the UK the utilities were 
nationalised from the 1940s to the 1980s, but other also sectors experienced extensive 
regulation including the ports under the National Dock Labour Scheme and commercial 
television.  It is noteworthy that unions normally opposed the privatisation of the utilities and 
deregulation of sectors like commercial TV or legal practice.  The relevant test here is 
whether unions made wage concessions and experienced membership losses after 
deregulation. 
Returns on investment in physical capital or intangible capital such as R&D provide a 
further channel for union gains at the expense of profits.  “When the capital replacement 
cycle is long relative to the union’s time horizon, the ‘surplus’ that provides the return on 
durable and specialised capital, and that occurs only after costs are sunk, is vulnerable to 
capture by monopoly labor” (Hirsch and Addison 1986).  If this is the route to lower 
profitability the union effect definitely lowers investment and the accumulation of capital (see 
also Section 4). 
Profitability is one of the most difficult economic variables to measure.  Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) state, for example:  “The profits reported on company balance sheets 
generally differ from true economic profits.  They may differ in treatment of interest charges, 
in depreciation, in valuation of inventories or in estimation of pension fund liabilities.  For 
tax reasons, companies often seek to report lower profits than in fact they actually earn.  
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There are also problems in measuring the capital investments with which profits are 
compared.  Valuing machines of different vintages is difficult; the book value reported by 
accountants differs from the true value of assets.  Estimates rarely exist of important but 
nebulous forms of capital such as goodwill or reputation”.  Until recently studies of industry 
or company profitability tended to use two “objective” indicators.  First, the return on capital 
was defined as business revenue less variable (usually labour) costs divided by some measure 
of the value of capital such as the replacement cost of plant and equipment or the gross book 
value of total assets.  Second, the “price-cost margin” defined as the excess of prices over 
variable costs.  Not surprisingly these indicators came in for criticism.  It is, for example, 
notoriously difficult to measure the value of capital, and profits should be, conceptually, 
measured in present values rather than on an annual basis. 
More recently studies use an ordinal scale to sidestep such problems.  For example, in 
the UK WERS98 defines financial performance rather than profits and uses a subjective 
rather than objective measure.  The following question was put to managerial respondents:   
“I now want to ask you how your workplace is currently performing compared with other 
establishments in the same industry.  How would you assess your workplace’s financial 
performance?”  Responses were coded along a 5-point ordinal scale, from ‘a lot better than 
average’ to ‘a lot worse than average’.  Recent British and Australian studies of the 
association between union presence and profits/financial performance have used this kind of 
measure. 
Financial performance is influenced by many factors other than union presence and 
controls are included in statistical analyses to allow for this.  Workforce controls include 
percent part-time, female and skilled.  Workplace characteristics include size, location and 
vintage.  Some studies include controls for management characteristics like the extent of 
human resource management and the existence or otherwise of contingent pay.  The nature of 
the product market – the number of competitors for example – is also controlled for in some 
studies. 
 
b. Evidence 
 
The bulk of studies examining links between unionisation and financial performance refer to 
just four countries and these will be considered in turn.  “Prior reviews of the literature [for 
the US] have presented this relationship as an open and shut case:  unions reduce financial 
performance. . . . Empirical studies that have found a significant negative relationship 
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between unions and financial performance have used a variety of financial outcome 
measures, including price-cost margin, net revenues per unit of capital, Tobin’s q and stock 
market value” (Batt and Welbourne 2002).  For example, Addison and Hirsch’s (1989) 
review of 16 studies that used various methodologies and measures of profitability found a 
consistent large negative relationship between unions and financial performance.  This 
association was confirmed by Bronars et al. (1994) using data from the 1970s and 1980s for 
some 300 firms.  They concluded that there is “fairly strong and significant evidence that the 
total effect of higher union coverage is to reduce profitability”.  They argue that this effect 
does not come via unions directly sharing rents but rather occurs indirectly through any union 
impact on impact on investment behaviour and growth.  Kleiner (2001) updated the Addison 
and Hirsch review and similarly concluded “unions are still associated with lower profits”. 
The link between union recognition and shareholder wealth was analysed by Ruback 
and Zimmerman (1984) who found a 1.4% reduction in NYSE-listed firms’ stock prices on 
the day a petition to hold a union election is held (and a 2.4% for petitions which, ex post, are 
successful) and a further 1.4% fall on the day of a successful election, for a cumulative total 
loss of 3.3 percent.  Kuhn (1998) points out that, given the share of wages in costs and the 
average fraction of each firms employees involved in new unionisation bids, “this loss is 
surprisingly consistent with a 15% wage increase among newly unionised workers” which is 
the norm for new recognitions. 
Batt and Welbourne suggest, however, that the association between unions and profits 
is more “nuanced” than realised.  It is influenced – as elsewhere – for example, by product 
market competition and the degree of labour-management conflict:  “In sum, much of the 
evidence showing a negative relationship between unions and financial performance may be 
understood as a result of oligopolistic markets, mass production approaches to work 
organisation and conflictual labor relations in a particular historical period”.  Thus Batt and 
Welbourne accept the previous negative association but argue that labour and product 
markets have altered so fundamentally in the last decade or so that it may no longer hold – 
even though Kleiner’s (2001) survey suggests unions are still associated with lower profits. 
They point to the following developments in the 1990s.  First, US firms, particularly 
high tech and entrepreneurial firms, have adopted much more flexible approaches to 
organising work, such as “high performance work systems” (Appelbaum and Batt 1994) 
which reduce status differences between workers and managers.  Next, union power has 
dropped significantly, with union membership fa lling from 24% of the private sector 
workforce in 1973 to 10% in 1995.  Further, mutual gain and win-win approaches to 
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bargaining have transformed union-management relationships in many instances, leading to 
greater cooperation and less zero-sum conflict. 
So Batt and Welbourne revisited the relationship between unions and financial 
performance by drawing on evidence from 464 entrepreneurial firms at the time of their 
initial public offering (IPO) in 1993 and their subsequent financial performance 1993-1996 
(see Table 3).  These entrepreneurial firms are “small and young”.  They are less likely to 
have the kind of “monopoly union power”, conflictual labor management relations, or rigid 
work rules traditionally found in large US mass production enterprises.  These IPO firms are 
not concentrated among high tech companies.  They are split roughly equally between 
manufacturing and services and are located in all geographic areas within the United States.  
Just over one fifth (21%) report having a union at the time of the IPO.  Three measures of 
financial performance were used:  Tobin’s q is the ratio of market value to book value at the 
initial public offering; growth in earnings per share and growth in stock price.  The control 
variables were firm size and age, industry, region and the degree of risk at the time of the 
IPO. 
The results are pretty remarkable.  (This study was chosen as our exemplar precisely 
because the results are so out of line with other studies.)  Union presence is associated with 
significantly superior financial performance on all three measures.  For example, the growth 
in stock price was 17% higher in unionised firms than non-union firms and earnings per share 
were correspondingly 10% higher.  The authors conclude that “unionisation does not 
inevitably reduce financial performance.  Rather new forms of organising work and union-
management relations hold the promise of maximising shareholder wealth as well as 
employee welfare.  This is not an inevitable zero-sum trade-off”.  Thus the great weight of 
US studies suggest that unions reduce profits but it is just possible that changes in industrial 
relations and human resource management in the last decade have now weakened, or in some 
cases overturned, this previous stylised fact.  However, if unions really do boost profits this 
begs the question of why firms are not asking to be unionised.  The US evidence (e.g. Kleiner 
2001) demonstrates very strong continued employer resistance to unionisation. 
There are only a limited number of studies which have investigated the links between 
union presence and profitability in Japan.  Fortunately, the two most thorough studies have 
used very different samples but come to identical conclusions.  The exemplary study (see 
Table 3) by Tachibanaki and Noda (2000) presents evidence from a panel of 12 
manufacturing industries for the period 1966-1984.  Profits are measured objectively, via 
labour’s share in income, defined as wage payments divided by total value added.  Union 
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presence is indicated by either density or disputes – the number of disputes, workers involved 
or days lost.  Controls include the capital:labour and capital:output ratios, product market 
competition (as measured by the concentration ratio), average firm size and workforce 
characteristics such as the average age of employees and the proportions female or graduate. 
Union presence is associated with a higher fraction of income going to labour.  Prior 
to the 1970s oil shock union density, disputes and labour’s share were all rising.  After 1974 
density, disputes and labour’s share all fell.  For example, for the period 1966-74 an increase 
in the number of disputes by 10% increases labour’s share by 0.9% (the mean value is 38%) 
while a 10% rise in the number of workers involved in disputes is associated with a 0.27% 
increase in labour’s share.  The authors interpret these findings as causal and state 
unambiguously that “it is possible to conclude that the increase in labour disputes which 
occurred in the pre-oil crisis period raised labour shares, while the decrease during the post-
oil crisis lowered them”. 
More recent evidence comes from the cross section survey of 253 enterprises in the 
Kansai region, which includes Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe by Benson (1994).  Profits were 
measured by the rate of return on capital, indicated by pre-tax profit divided by total assets.  
Unionisation was captured by any members present or density or the presence of a full-time 
union official in the enterprise.  Numerous controls were included covering the characteristics 
of the enterprise, workforce, management practices, industrial relations and product market.  
Benson concludes that union presence “reduced the probability of managers reporting a rate 
of return of 6% or more [and] increased the probability that these enterprises would have 
lower profits”.  Higher wage costs in unionised firms are suggested to explain lower 
profitability.  Union firms may not pay a higher base wage but pay higher bonuses, higher 
female wages and have lower annual hours. 
In the 1980s virtually all UK studies reported a negative association between union 
presence and financial performance.  For example Metcalf (1993) reported that “Eight UK 
studies use workplaces, firms or industries to analyse the link between profitability and 
unionisation:  all but one show a negative association”.  But Wilkinson (2000) notes that 
“Over the course of the 1980s this negative impact weakened such that by 1990 the overall 
union effect was halved as compared to 1984 and unionised establishments had lower 
financial perfo rmance only where the union was strong and the establishment had some 
product market power”.  This tempering of the impact of unions was confirmed by Machin 
and Stewart (1996) who concluded that by 1990 unions only impacted adversely on 
profitability where there was a closed shop and/or weak competition in the product market.  
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They also found that multi-unionism detracts from good financial performance.  By 1990 the 
closed shop was outlawed in the UK and during the 1990s there was growing competition in 
the product market and a lower incidence of multi-unionism.  It is plausible, therefore, that 
any impact of unions on financial performance would be attenuated by the end of the decade. 
The most thorough investigation of such links is by Wilkinson (2000) using the 
WERS98 sample (see Table 3).  Wilkinson analysed links between financial performance and 
unionisation using 4 different WERS samples and a number of different indicators of union 
presence and the ordinal financial performance scale noted above.  Union presence was also 
measured in four ways:  simple recognition; then the extent of collective bargaining coverage 
with or without recognition was added; then the level of bargaining was added – workplace, 
organisation, industry and multiple.  Finally there was a union strength measure.  A strong 
union was defined as one with 100% coverage or membership.  A weak union was one with 
under 50% coverage and membership.  All remaining recognised unions were defined as 
medium strength.  By the end of the 1990s Wilkinson states that there was no overall 
association between union presence and financial performance.  A total of 76 coefficients are 
reported (4 samples and 19 different union indicators) and only four (2 positive, 2 negative) 
are significant at the 5% level.  More of the coefficients were positive (45) than negative (31).  
This lack of association probably reflects weaker union effects on pay and productivity.   
There is little doubt that any impact of UK unions on financial performance is muted 
now compared with two decades ago.  The “average” results – no effects – found by 
Wilkinson are confirmed by both Addison and Belfield (2000) and McNabb and Whitfield 
(2000).  As Bryson and Wilkinson (2002) put it “the absence of general union effects on 
financial performance implies that the negative influence of unions on performance identified 
by previous studies has diminished in the 1990s”.  But some residual union effects do remain 
when different tests are done.  First, Pencavel (2001) shows that multi-unionism continues to 
have adverse consequences for financial performance.  Second, unions have a very different 
effect on profits (and productivity) when the product market is monopolistic compared with 
when it is competitive (Metcalf 2003).  When there are 5 or fewer competitors, unions are 
associated with significantly worse financial performance but union recognition has no such 
impact when the product market is more competitive.  Third, Wilkinson finds that it is weak 
unions which have negative associations, while medium and strong unions have a positive 
link with performance.  This hints that where a union is recognised it is – at least when 
considering financial performance – better to have an encompassing union rather than one 
where under half the workforce belong. 
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When examining the characteristics and influences of unions and works councils on 
profitability in Germany it is important to bear in mind the unique features of the dual system 
of cooperative industrial relations.  First, pay settlements take place at the industry-level and 
are therefore decoupled from participatory and other factors at the plant-level (Hassel 1999).  
This means that work councils are excluded from the negotiation and settlement of wage 
agreements with the employer ‘unless the latter explicitly authorises work agreements of such 
type’ (Addison et al. 1996).  Rather, works councils focus on their extensive rights covering 
information, consultation and co-determination at the plant level.  Second, in order to ensure 
cooperation at plant level, the Works Constitution Act of 1972 has precluded any strike 
activity initiated by works councils.  The legislation even ‘enjoins the employer and works 
council to work in a spirit of mutual trust’.  Third, although works councils are formally 
independent of unions, in practice the two institutions are intertwined.  Works councils feed 
trade unions with members, reserve seats for union members and supervise the 
implementation of collective agreements, and trade unions support and help works councils 
in their local bargaining function.  The bulk of the literature analysing the link between 
institutions and profits in Germany has focussed on works councils rather than unions. 
Bearing in mind that works councils are neither allowed to strike nor to bargain on 
wages, it seems reasonable to predict a positive impact on profitability as suggested by the 
collective voice model.  During the 1990s there was considerable interest in studies 
measuring and evaluating the link between works councils and profitability.  This was mostly 
a reaction to the debate on the transferability of the German model of mandatory works 
councils initiated by the Dunlop Commission (1994) in the United States.  In the event 
various studies surveyed by Schedlitzki (2002) reported a negative impact of works councils 
on profitability.  Addison et al. (1996) similarly argue that ‘the works council is a classic 
vehicle for the expression of collective voice, [but] ‘the dual system of industrial relations in 
Germany by no means excludes the possibility that works councils are rent-seeking 
agencies’.  
The most recent and thorough study measuring the link between works councils and 
profitability is by Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001).  They used data from two waves of 
the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel conducted in 1994 and 1996 that was collected in personal 
interviews by Infratest Sozialforschung.  The dataset is representative of all manufacturing 
establishments in Lower Saxony, and contains information on 1,025 plants.  Top 
management was asked to rate the establishment’s current profitability on an ordinal scale 
from ‘very good’ to ‘very bad’.  The authors measured works council presence via a dummy 
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variable.  Further, detailed establishment controls were included such as size, the market 
share of the most important product line, capacity utilisation, profit sharing for the workforce 
and for management, the state of production technology and industry. 
The results show a statistically significant negative association between works 
councils and profitability.  This finding ‘obtains irrespective of the profit indicator and 
sample’ (Addison et al. 2001).  This confirms a previous detailed study (Addison et al. 2000) 
which concluded:  “among both small and large establishments, works councils are 
associated with significantly lower profitability”.  In many ways the consistent empirical 
finding that the existence of a works council lowers profits is something of a surprise.  Works 
councils do not formally bargain and cannot initiate a strike, and they express the collective 
voice of the employees.  So what is the mechanism by which they adversely impact on 
financial performance?  Two channels have been put forward.  Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) 
suggest that works councils are themselves linked to various legal provisions which constrain 
competent managers – and such constraints are not present when there is no council.  
Alternatively, Addison et al. (2001) show that although councils do not formally bargain they 
do engage in rent seeking behaviour and achieve a higher wage level than counterpart firms 
without a council. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of unions on profitability is quite scarce and rather 
inconclusive.  Huebler and Jirjahn (2001) measured the effect of collective bargaining 
coverage on the rent-seeking behaviour of works councils and hence on the impact of works 
councils on firm performance.  They found that works councils in establishments covered by 
collective agreements were less likely to be engaged in rent-seeking activities and therefore 
less likely to impact negatively on firm performance.  In a nutshell, where there is collective 
bargaining the works council engages less in rent seeking than it would do without collective 
bargaining.  This emphasises, again, how important it is to examine the institutional 
framework in which unions operate. 
 
c Summary 
 
If unions raise the level of pay the resources to fund the higher wages must come from 
somewhere.  There are four possibilities.  Unions may have a corresponding positive impact 
on productivity.  Or, non-union employees may receive corresponding lower wages.  
Alternatively, consumers may fund the higher pay via higher retail prices.  Finally – and the 
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focus of interest here – firms’ profits might be lower.  There are limits on each of these 
routes. 
Capital may receive lower returns and labour an increased share of income.  Broadly, 
this can happen in three ways.  First, if the firm has monopoly power in the product market 
the union is, in principle, able to siphon off a fraction of the monopoly profits.  Next in state 
owned or regulated industries entry and price competition are typically limited and such 
restrictions on competition may permit unions to absorb some of the rents in such firms.  
Finally, unions may cream off returns which more properly belong to sunk investments in 
physical capital or R&D.  This third has important deleterious effects on the long run health 
of the unionised sector. 
The evidence is pretty clear-cut.  The bulk of studies show that profits or financial 
performance is inferior in unionised workplaces, firms and sectors than in their non-union 
counterparts.  This was documented for USA, Japan, UK and Germany.  But the link between 
unionisation and profitability is more nuanced than first meets the eye.  In the US and the UK 
industrial relations has altered profoundly in the last two decades, thereby tempering the 
traditional association between unions and profits.  In the US many firms – particularly 
smaller, entrepreneurial firms – have adopted high performance work systems.  
Simultaneously, union power has corroded and parties are now more likely to adopt a mutual 
gains approach to bargaining.  A recent study of such firms found a positive link between the 
presence of a union and profitability.  In the UK product market competition has been greatly 
enhanced.  And the outlawing of the closed shop coupled with a lower incidence of multi-
unionism has contributed to a more cooperative style of industrial relations.  Consequently all 
the very recent UK studies find no links between unions and financial performance. 
Germany is something of a surprise.  It has a dual system of industrial relations such 
that collective bargaining occurs at sector level while efficiency issues are dealt with in the 
workplace.  Works councils have statutory information and consultation rights and provide 
employee voice on issues like the introduction of technical change and alterations in work 
patterns.  Yet the evidence shows that the presence of a works council lowers financial 
performance.  In turn this is attributed either to the fact that, actually, works councils do 
engage in rent seeking activity, or to the constraints imposed by the works council on 
otherwise able management. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that any union impact on financial performance not 
only affects investment in physical and human capital (considered next) but may also 
influence the rate of growth of employment and the probability that the workplace or firm 
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closes as between union and non-union organisation.  A survey of studies on employment and 
closures would require a separate paper.  In very broad terms US and UK evidence (see e.g. 
Bryson 2001, Kleiner and Freeman 1999) suggests that any union impact on profits has little 
or no association with closure – unions may cannily focus on monopoly profit and know just 
how far to push.  But employment in union workplaces grows (falls) some 3% p.a. less 
(faster) than that in non-union workplaces.  This has serious implications both for the 
displaced members themselves and for future union membership. 
 
 
4. Investment 
 
Capital accumulation is the key to long run growth.  Therefore the impact of unions on 
investment is a matter of great importance.  In this section we examine the routes by which 
unions might influence investment, and the evidence that exists on this issue for our six 
countries “but there is surprisingly little empirical research analysing unions’ impact on 
investment” (Odgers and Betts 1997).  The arguments typically refer to investment in new 
technology and process innovations, but could also be used to analyse any effect unions 
might have on investment in research and development; on product improvements through 
design, marketing, advertising and after sales service; and on human capital where a few 
studies are now appearing and assume greater importance with the growth of the knowledge 
economy (these are analysed in Section 5).  A further dimension (not analysed here) concerns 
‘where to invest’ which influences closure and relocation decisions, especially in multi-
establishment organisations. 
 
a. Theory 
 
Rent seeking behaviour by unions suggests a negative impact on investment.  By contrast the 
traditional on-the-demand curve approach implies union firms substitute away from 
expensive labour and invest more. 
The presence of a union in a workplace might inhibit investment either directly or 
indirectly in the rent-seeking model.  The direct effect occurs if a union delays the installation 
of new machinery, perhaps because the union representatives are not content with associated 
organisational changes such as modifications to shift patterns or any required easing of skill 
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demarcations.  Further, inflexible work rules might mean that the investment is not used to its 
full capacity, effectively adding to the cost of installation. 
Indirect union effects are set out formally by Grout (1984a,b).  When a firm invests in 
a new project, unionised workers may capture (“tax”) some of the returns in the form of 
higher pay because, once the capital is installed or the R&D done, the process cannot easily 
be reversed thereby weakening the firm’s bargaining position.  This “holdup” reduces the 
profit incentive for new investment thereby depressing the overall investment rate.  It was 
shown in Section 3 that the union may be able to appropriate rents accruing from monopoly 
power in the product market.  The argument here is that, in addition, the union is able to 
capture quasi-rents from capital that represent some of the normal competitive return to 
capital.  If part of the competitive return is captured by unions, firms will reduce investment 
in capital (see Odgers and Betts 1997 for more details).  Hirsch (1992) describes this 
behaviour as “rational myopia” because unions’ members have a lack of interest in wages far 
into the future.  Any such rational myopia can lead to opportunistic behaviour by the union. 
There is an offsetting force.  In the traditional on-the-demand curve model the union-
set wage is exogenous and the firm adjusts along the demand curve.  Therefore a higher 
union wage stimulates investment because the firm substitutes away from expensive labour.  
In this case union activity raises investment (although the positive substitution effect might 
be attenuated by a negative scale effect), but recall that higher investment consequent on 
wage push does not necessarily raise social welfare (see Section 2). 
As the rent seeking model predicts unions have a negative effect on investment but 
the traditional substitution approach predicts a positive impact the issue cannot be decided 
empirically:  any impact of unions on capital accumulation is an empirical matter. 
 
b. Evidence 
 
Studies of the impact of unionisation on investment in the USA reach a remarkably consistent 
conclusion – a union presence reduces investment.  The classic studies are by Hirsch (1990, 
1991) dealing with union effects on physical capital accumulation.  The 1990 study (see 
Table 4) used detailed data from 315 American firms and matched investment and other 
firm/sector information spanning 1970 to 1980 to union density in 1972.  The evidence 
suggested that unionisation reduced investment by 20% plus in the typical union firm.  
Around half this effect was a consequence of the rent seeking activity described in the theory 
section above and the other half came via the reduced profitability associated with unions.  
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Hirsch’s second study had even more observations and covered a later period and got similar 
results.  More recently Hirsch (1992), Bronars and Deere (1993) and Bronars, Deere and 
Tracy (1994) have each reached the same conclusion using different data sets:  at firm level, 
higher levels of unionisation are associated with lower investment rates.  For example 
Bronars et al. (1994) state that a 10% increase in unionisation decreases the R&D/sales ratio 
by around 4% in manufacturing, the advertising/sales ratio by some 6% in manufacturing and 
a bit less in non-manufacturing. 
Results from a detailed study by Odgers and Betts (1997) for Canada mirror those 
from the USA.  The data set contains observations for 18 Canadian manufacturing industries 
on profits, taxation, investment, capital stock, employment, union membership, imports and 
exports and the study uses a balanced panel of 378 industry/year observations 1967-87.  The 
impact of unions on investment (as on productivity) seems rather large in Canada.  An 
industry with an average unionisation rate experiences a reduction in its gross investment rate 
of 18-25% relative to a similar non-union industry.  The corresponding reduction of net 
investment is put at 66-74%.  It is a nice question how Canadian unionised manufacturing 
industry survives given such large effects. 
Hirsch found that the steepest declines in US investment occurred at low levels of 
unionisation.  This non- linear impact of unions on investment is replicated for Canada and 
the UK.  Odgers and Betts (1997) suggest that one reason for this non- linear effect is “a 
plateau effect in union bargaining power” such that if firms cannot easily substitute one type 
of labour for another “a union representing any of these types of labour can extract most of 
the quasi-rents by threatening to strike. . . . it follows that a relatively small component of a 
firm’s workforce could extract most of the quasi-rent for itself”.  An alternative explanation 
is that the voice effects of an encompassing union are more beneficial than those generated 
by partial coverage.   
UK evidence is fully surveyed in Metcalf (1993) and is mixed.  Denny and Nickell 
(1991, 1992) get the most clear-cut union effects (see Table 4).  Their sample is drawn from 
manufacturing industries and incorporates information on industrial relations variables from 
WIRS1 and WIRS2.  They find, for 1980-4 – before unions were tamed - that union 
recognition depressed investment, but that this adverse effect was offset as density rose.  
However, even 100% density did not completely counter the negative recognition effect.  By 
implication, they point out that the worst possible situation is union recognition but with only 
a small fraction of the workforce being union members.  Voice effects are also apparent – 
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where many workers are covered by joint consultative councils (whether in union or non-
union workplaces) - investment rates are higher. 
Union density in Germany tends to be negatively related to investment in capital and 
in R&D.  Likewise the presence of a works council tends to reduce the investment or 
innovation rate.  But these links between mechanisms of employee representation and 
investment are almost all non-significant (see Schedlitzki 2002 for a full survey).  One 
exception is the study of Addison, Kraft and Wagner (1993) which gets quite clear cut 
effects.  The sample was 101 manufacturing firms in Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg.  
After controlling for other factors which might influence the investment rate – like capacity 
utilisation and product innovation – the authors find that an establishment with a works 
council has a gross investment rate between a fifth and a third below a counterpart firm 
without a council.  The impact on net investment is also negative but much weaker. 
Benson (1994) is one of the few who have analysed the links between unions and 
investment in Japan.  The definition of union presence and controls were as set out in Section 
2 dealing with productivity.  There was no available evidence on investment rates so, instead, 
Benson used labour’s share in total cost arguing that (1- labour’s share) measures capital 
intensity which “reflects capital investment in the long run”.  The evidence suggests that 
union recognition goes hand- in-hand with greater capital intensity.  There is no evidence that 
unions siphon off returns to capital or impose restrictions on the use of capital – under 6% of 
managers claimed that unions constrained them in the introduction of new technology.  
Rather, capital- labour substitution was sometimes promoted by the union because “in many 
cases the introduction of new technology has replaced dirty, dangerous or repetitive work”.  
If this latter explanation is correct it suggests that “holdup” in Japan is not the problem it is in 
the US and Canada. 
 
c. Summary 
 
Unions can influence investment in physical capital both positively and negatively.  Any 
positive effect occurs when the firm invests more to substitute away from expensive union 
labour.  The negative impact is directly observed when a union delays the installation of new 
machinery.  But there is possibly a more subtle, indirect, negative effect if unions raise wages 
and thereby capture returns properly due to (sunk) investment. 
North American and German evidence suggests that unionisation reduces investment 
by around one fifth compared with the investment rate in a non-union workplace.  
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Importantly, in both Canada and the USA this effect is felt at even low levels of unionisation.  
The UK evidence is mixed:  the most thorough study also finds that union recognition 
depresses investment, but this adverse effect is offset as density rises.  The exception is Japan 
where union recognition goes hand- in-hand with greater capital intensity. 
 
 
5. Extensions 
 
Many of the issues raised in Sections 2-4 are worthy of more detailed investigation.  In this 
section we examine five such matters.  Links between the product market and the labour 
market show the crucial role that competition plays in moderating any union effects.  
Similarly, in both the USA and UK, cooperative industrial relations between capital and 
labour are shown to yield superior outcomes to adversarial relations.  Union structures matter 
too:  multi-unionism is associated with worse productivity and financia l performance than a 
single union or enterprise unions.  The long run health of any enterprise depends on sufficient 
investment.  While findings on links between unions and capital investment are mixed, it is 
shown here that a union presence boosts investment in human capital in both the USA and 
UK.  Finally, the unique dual structure of industrial relations in Germany is discussed.  The 
information, consultation and voice role of works councils does seem to raise productivity but 
these institutions also engage in rent-seeking activities similar to unions in the other countries 
analysed here. 
 
a. Links between the product market and the labour market 
 
Links between the product market and the labour market have not received sufficient 
attention in many of the  studies surveyed in Sections 2-4.  Recall that Nickell (2001) points 
out:  “What unions do depends on what they can do, and this depends on the extent of 
product market competition”.  It is well known that non-competitive product markets permit 
unions to raise wages.  But, as Nickell states, unions can capture product market rents in 
forms other than wages:  “For example, they can impose rigidities in the workplace to reduce 
the pace of work [which] may discourage innovation and result in lower productivity 
growth”. 
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The British WERS permits this matter to be investigated thoroughly because it 
contains information on the number of competitors faced by each workplace.  Metcalf (2003) 
has analysed how variation in product market competition influences the impact of unions on 
labour productivity, quality of product service and financial performance.  The results are 
summarised in Table 5 and demonstrate the crucial role played by product market 
competition in determining union influence.  The nationally representative sample covered 
around 1200 workplaces in the trading sector.  In the survey productivity, service quality and 
financial performance are defined by the familiar 5-point scale and this was collapsed to the 
probability that a workplace was above average on the indicator.  Unionisation was defined 
by recognition and numerous workplace and workforce controls included. 
When no account is taken of product market competition unionisation has a modest 
negative impact on each of the three variables.  But it will be seen that the results are driven 
by the non-competitive sector.  Thus when there are just 1-5 competitors the probability of 
above average labour productivity is 14% lower for a unionised workplace than its non-union 
counterpart.  But when there are 6 or more competitors the corresponding figure is 0.6% (not 
statistically significant).  And when there is little product market competition the likelihood 
of above average financial performance is 12.4% lower for a union than non-union 
workplace, yet the corresponding figure is 7.4% higher with a more competitive product 
market. 
If replicated for other countries results like this have profound implications for the 
future of unions.  Blanchard (2001) has noted that across OECD countries “rents are getting 
smaller, leading to less room for rent extraction. . . . this decrease in attractiveness [of unions 
to members] is reflected, in nearly all countries, by decreased membership and support”.  
More intense product market competition implies a corrosion of the impact of union 
recognition in the workplace which suggests that in the longer term unions may need to find a 
different role if they are to prosper. 
 
b. Role of, and unions links with, management 
 
Our focus is on links between unionism and productivity, perfo rmance and profitability.  Of 
course, performance is affected by numerous factors other than unionisation – that is why so 
many control variables are included in the studies analysed in Sections 2-4.  But there is one 
factor, so far inadequately discussed, which may both dominate and itself affect any impact 
unions have on performance, namely – management.  The debate in the management 
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literature turns on whether or not those firms and workplaces with high- involvement 
management (HIM) practices such as job flexibility, team working and minimal differences 
in status will universally outperform those without and/or the importance of aligning such 
HIM practices to the business or competitive strategy of the firm in order to achieve superior 
performance.  In his  exhaustive survey Wood (1999) states that the evidence on both issues is 
mixed and that it is too early to draw general conclusions on the importance of management 
practices and strategy.  For us a narrower issue is important.  If relations between 
management and unions are cooperative does the workplace have a superior performance to 
those with adversarial relations?  This is an important matter.  It should, for example, be 
remembered (see Section 2) that Freeman and Medoff (1984) held that superior performance 
is contingent on cooperation between labour and capital. 
We have evidence on this issue for both the USA and UK and it is remarkably 
consistent.  Section 2 noted the USA manufacturing evidence.  Black and Lynch (1997) 
showed that there was a hierarchy for productivity performance.  A traditional workplace 
with union recognition but no employee involvement does worse.  In the middle are non-
union plants with high performance work (HPW) systems, but superior productivity 
performance is achieved by establishments with both HPW practices and union recognition.  
Analogous evidence for the UK is set out in Table 6 (for more details see Metcalf 2003).  A 
HRM workplace with no union has a superior productivity and financial performance to a 
unionised workplace with no HRM.  But when the workplace with union recognition also has 
the various HRM practices its performance is much enhanced, indeed in the case of labour 
productivity growth the best performing workplaces are those with both HRM and 
recognition. 
Another way of analysing the influence of cooperative industrial relations is to study 
partnerships.  As espoused by the British TUC (1998) partnership agreements include mutual 
recognition of the roles of management and the union, joint commitment to the success of the 
business and job security, open information sharing, continuous improvement in the quality 
of working life and adding value.  The spread of such agreements has been rapid.  For 
example Gall (2000) states that there were 748 new recognitions agreements in the five-year 
period beginning in 1995 and of these 150 are partnership agreements.  Further, many 
previous recognitions have been transformed into similar agreements.  The impact of such 
partnerships in British workplaces is set out in Table 6.  A workplace is defined as having a 
partnership when a union negotiates pay and management negotiates with, or consults, the 
union(s) on recruitment, training, payment systems, handling grievances, staff planning, 
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equal opportunities, health and safety and  performance appraisals.  It will be seen that such 
designs significantly raise the probability of above average performance for financial 
performance and both the level of and change in labour productivity.  These are potentially 
important findings.  Union recognition with partnership yields substantially better economic 
and industrial relations outcomes than union recognition without partnership. 
 
c. Union structure and organisation 
 
The nature of workplace unionism varies considerably both within and among countries.  For 
example in some workplaces union membership is or was compulsory (defined as a union 
shop in the USA and a closed shop in the UK).  In other, typically larger, workplaces multiple 
unions exist side-by-side to represent the interests of different groups like craft and less 
skilled employees.  Such multiple unionism is a distinctive feature of industrial relations in 
Australia and the UK.  By contrast, in Japan enterprise unions are the norm – one union for 
one enterprise.  It is worth considering briefly some links between union organisation and 
workplace performance outcomes.  For example how does productivity or financial 
performance compare under enterprise unionism versus multi-unionism? 
Multiple unionism is generally held to be detrimental to performance because of the 
greater difficulty of reaching agreement among the parties, communication and demarcation 
problems and inter-union competition.  Bean and Crafts (1996) go as far as to suggest that the 
decline of multi-unionism in the UK in the 1980s was the key alteration in industrial relations 
contributing to the raising of Britain’s productivity growth.  Pencavel (2002) provides the 
most up to date analysis for the UK.  He first compares union with non-union workplaces, 
then goes on to contrast multi-union workplaces with joint bargaining (where the multiple 
unions sit around a “single table”) and those with separate bargaining.  He finds that union 
recognition is associated with lower financial returns and when there is multi-unionism if 
bargaining is fragmented the workplace is over 5% less likely to have better than average 
financial performance compared to a joint bargaining workplace.  Likewise, for labour 
productivity, although there is no overall association between union presence and labour 
productivity, when there are multi-unions, workplaces with fragmented bargaining have a 4% 
lower probability of being better/lot better than average compared with those with joint 
bargaining.  He concludes that:  “On average, by the late 1990s, unionism per se has 
negligible effects on productivity; the state of labour relations is the key variable associated 
with productivity and, in Britain, workplaces with fragmented bargaining are associated with 
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poorer productivity.  With respect to financial performance, unions tend to reallocate an 
organisation’s rents towards workers and this occurs more substantially in fragmented 
bargaining workplaces”.  This conclusion is replicated in Australia where Crockett et al. 
(1992) state that “where there are several unions present, the detrimental effect on 
productivity is greater than if the workplace had a single union”. 
This evidence begs the question as to why management was prepared to recognise 
multiple unions in the first place.  Presumably it reflects either incompetence, possibly 
motivated by divide-and-rule tactics, or an inability to control the growth of such multi-
unionism because the costs of doing so would have been greater than the benefits.  It is 
noteworthy that alterations in the political climate in both the UK and Australia yielded a 
reduction in fragmented bargaining in recent years. 
In Japan enterprise unionism is the normal type of union organisation such that there 
is one union in one firm.  All regular and permanent employees – blue collar, white collar and 
sales – who do not occupy managerial positions join the union which organises in the one 
firm.  Tachibanaki and Noda (2000) state that this imparts “common goals” among 
management and employees particularly in overcoming economic crises facing a firm:  
“Enterprise unionism [is] one of the sources of a relatively better performance of firms in 
Japan because it encourages cooperative behaviour of unions towards management . . . unions 
want to work in close cooperation with management because they believe that a cooperative 
attitude produces an ultimate benefit to them.  A more direct interest in the overall 
performance of the firm is ultimately more beneficial to employees than adversarial 
behaviour”.  On this basis we might expect that a union presence would be associated with 
superior productivity and investment performance and possibly even better financial 
performance than non-union counterparts.  In the event, as we showed in Sections 2-4, while 
capital accumulation rates are higher in unionised workplaces both productivity and profit 
levels are modestly lower.  However, the direct productivity effect is offset by a favourable 
indirect effect stemming from longer tenures and, in some enterprises, the presence of a full-
time union official who acts as an unpaid personnel manager.  So, it may be that enterprise 
unions actually have rather similar links with performance to traditional western unions. 
 
d. Investment in human capital 
 
The presence of a union might influence investment in human capital in the workplace over 
and above any more traditional effect on investment in physical capital or R&D.  Such 
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investment in the incidence and amount of training could be higher where a union is 
recognised for the following reasons.  First, unions might widen their bargaining agenda to 
include investment in human capital, a way of raising employees’ living standards in the 
longer run.  Second, unions provide a voice thereby lowering labour turnover which, in turn, 
increases the incentives of both the employer and employee to invest as they will reap a 
return over a longer period.  Third, the lower labour turnover in unionised workplaces implies 
greater job security and employees will feel less threatened by alterations to working 
practices which may flow from investment in human capital.  Finally, a unionised workplace 
is more likely to have a formal procedure to identify training needs and to implement them. 
Alternatively, some arguments point in the opposite direction.  First, if unions raise 
wages compared with similar non-union workers the firm may not be able to afford to invest 
in human capital.  Second, seniority is an important (objective) factor in promotion decisions 
in unionised workplaces, which may reduce the incentive of employees to invest in training.  
Third, Green et al. (1999) points out that, in Britain for example, greater aggregate 
investment in human capital in the last two decades has occurred at a time when unions have 
become much weaker.  As good arguments can be advanced to suggest unions might either 
increase or decrease investment in human capital the issue can only be settled empirically. 
There is quite a large body of empirical research investigating the relationship 
between training and unionism for the USA.  Booth et al. (2001) summarises it as follows:  
“Some of the early studies find a negative impact of unions on training (e.g. Duncan and 
Stafford 1980).  More recent studies, however, find that the probability of receiving on-the-
job training and the amount of work-related training received are higher for unionised 
workers than non-unionised ones (e.g. Lynch 1992; Frazis, Herz and Horrigan 1995).  An 
exception is the study by Lynch and Black (1998), which uses data from a 1994 
representative survey of US establishments and reports no statistically significant impact of 
unionisation on either the provision of formal training or the proportion of workers receiving 
it.  It should be noted that this study concentrates on a rather specific set of formal training 
programmes, including computer literacy training, teamwork or problem solving training, 
literacy, numeracy or basic training, and sales or customer service training”. 
British evidence (Booth 1991 and Claydon and Green 1994) also points to a positive 
impact of union presence on training investments.  Recently Green et al. (1999) used 
nationally representative samples to analyse both the incidence and intensity of training.  It 
will be seen from Table 7 that unionised establishments and workers are more likely to 
provide and receive training than their non-union counterparts (panel 1).  This union impact 
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holds with even more force for the intensity of training (panel 2).  Consider, for example, 
non-manual workers.  A unionised workplace provided nearly an extra day of training during 
the previous year (the sample average is 2.7 days so this is a large effect).  Likewise 
unionised workers received an extra 0.34 hours of training in the previous week (sample 
average 1.3 hours).  Related work (Arulampalam and Booth 1997) suggests that these 
positive union effects hold more strongly for women than men.  Booth et al. (2001) also 
suggest that the payoff to such training is greater for union workers than non-unionists.  For 
union men the post-training wage was 21% higher than the pre-training wage, but the 
corresponding increase for non-unionism was only 4 percent.  This is an important finding 
because it contradicts the often-stated notion that egalitarian or seniority-based union wage 
policies reduce the return to investing in human capital. 
 
e. Works councils and employee involvement in Germany 
 
The German industrial relations system is well known for its unique dual-structure of 
employee representation.  Collective agreements are negotiated between trade unions and 
employers’ associations at the industry- level, while works councils watch the implementation 
and coordination of such agreements in the workplace.  Theoretically, works councils are 
pure agents of employee representation because legislation forbids them to engage in any 
form of industrial action or to negotiate wage agreements.  Reality looks a bit different as 
trade union members very often dominate works councils so the line between the rent-
seeking behaviour of trade unions and the voice function of works councils is often blurred. 
Generally, works councils constitute the most important collective voice institution in 
Germany.  They were legally established in 1920, but the current form and legal basis has its 
origin in the Works Constitution Act, passed in 1952 (Mueller-Jentsch 1995).  This Act 
prescribes an extensive set of information, consultation and co-determination rights to the 
works council.  Employers have to inform works councils on the current and future economic 
situation of the firm, on reductions in operations and introduction of new work methods.  
Further, works councils have to be consulted on issues such as dismissals, personnel 
planning, and changes in equipment.  Additionally, works councils have co-determination 
rights on social and personnel matters. 
Some stud ies have analysed the incidence of works councils.  For example Sadowski, 
Junkes and Lindenthal (2001) state that only a fifth of eligible plants use their right to form a 
works council, but that such plants employ some two thirds of all eligible employees.  The 
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probability of a works council being present increases with plant size, age of firm and with 
the share of workers and that it decreases with the share of part-time and female workers.  
There is also evidence (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 1997) works councils are less likely 
to exist where the firm or workplace has well developed direct or indirect participation 
mechanisms. 
In broad terms recent evidence suggests that works councils increase productivity, 
reduce profitability, and have a negative but insignificant impact on investment and 
innovation (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2001; Addison, Kraft and Wagner 1993; Frick 
1996; Frick and Sadowski 1995.  See Frege 2002 for a useful critique of these studies.)  The 
behaviour of works councils can probably be best explained via a mixture of the monopoly 
union model and the collective voice model.  The monopoly model explains the negative 
relationship between works councils and profits, by suggesting that the extensive set of legal 
rights prescribed to works councils, the domination of trade union members and the indirect 
impact on wage determination jointly foster rent-seeking behaviour on the part of works 
councils.  Further, the collective voice model proposes that the provision of a formal 
collective voice for the workforce will improve the working climate, reduce labour turnover 
and tend to raise productivity. 
Until the early 1990s, the German model of centralised bargaining was famous for its 
high degree of consensus, social cohesion, few disputes, competitiveness and high levels of 
training (Hassel 1999).  But this system is facing pressure from international competition and 
moves to decentralise.  Hassel (1999) suggests that a steady erosion of the dual structure and 
therefore the decrease in the incidence of works councils and trade union presence is quite 
likely in the near future.  In the face of a potential future “representation gap”, it is worth 
investigating what could or already does substitute the works council as the formal plant-
level institution of employee representation.  In recent years, new forms of employee 
representation, also known as “employee involvement (EI) programmes”, have emerged in 
Germany.  Those programmes allow employees to participate in the decision-making of a 
company.  Several US and UK studies have suggested a positive relationship between such 
EI programmes and establishment profitability, so employers might consider those 
programmes as possible substitutes for works councils in terms of employee representation. 
Schedlitzki (2002) has investigated the impact of works councils and EI programmes 
on establishment profitability and the interaction between those two forms of employee 
representation.  The theoretical underpinnings are based on the “managerial competence” 
hypothesis (FitzRoy and Kraft 1985), which argues that competent managers will provide 
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employee representation on their own initiative, yielding higher profits because they do 
without the legal complexity and rent-seeking behaviour of works councils.  Competent  
managers are assumed to know about the efficiency of EI programmes and to implement 
them.  Consequently, presence of EI programmes is defined as a proxy for the presence of 
competent managers.  This permits the “managerial competence” hypothesis, the interaction 
of works councils and EI programmes and their impact on establishment profitability to be 
studied. 
The research used data from the third wave of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, which 
is representative of the manufacturing industry in Lower Saxony, Germany.  It confirmed the 
“managerial competence” hypothesis:  there is a negative impact of works councils, and a 
positive impact of EI programmes, on establishment profitability.  When both a works 
council and an EI programme were present in a workplace profitability was lower compared 
to a workplace with just EI.  It was concluded that the competent managers do better without 
works councils so in future employers may focus on EI programmes as the major vehicle for 
employee representation.  Such a move would be congruent with recent US evidence (Kleiner 
and Freeman 2000) which suggests that EI “has no adverse effects or a slight positive effect 
on the bottom line” while simultaneously workers report that EI has a “strong [positive] 
effect on their working lives”. 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
If the presence of a union in a workplace or firm raises the pay level, unless productivity rises 
correspondingly, financial performance is likely to be worse.  If the product market is 
uncompetitive this might imply a simple transfer from capital to labour with no efficiency 
effects, but is probably more likely to lead to lower investment rates and economic 
senescence.  Therefore the impact of unions on productivity, financial performance and 
investment is extremely important.  This chapter distils evidence on such effects from six 
countries:  USA, Canada, UK, Germany, Japan and Australia.  These countries were chosen 
for two reasons.  First, the bulk of the evidence is for them.  Second, they have very different 
systems of industrial relations on dimensions like density, coverage and level of collective 
bargaining, coordination, labour standards, employment protection, union structures and 
voice mechanisms.  In principle, this diversity should contribute to understanding where 
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unions have favourable or unfavourable effects.  The unit of analysis in this chapter switches 
between sectors, firms and workplaces.  There is an urgent need for comparative analysis of 
union effects using international data with standardised measures of unionisation and 
performance. 
It is not possible to use theory to predict unambiguously any union effect on 
productivity because unions can both enhance and detract from the productivity performance 
of the workplace or firm.  Union presence may lower labour productivity via:  restrictive 
work practices; industrial action; causing the firm to invest less; and if adversarial industrial 
relations lowers trust and cooperation.  Alternatively labour productivity may be beneficially 
higher in the presence of a union if:  unions may play a monitoring role on behalf of the 
employer; collective voice provided by the union has favourable consequences; unions may 
make managers less lethargic; and unions stop exploitation of labour. 
The evidence indicates that, in the USA, workplaces with both high performance 
work systems and union recognition have higher labour productivity than other workplaces.  
And a case study of bitter adversarial industrial relations at a tyre plant showed what a 
dreadful effect this had on the quality of the product.  In the UK previous negative links 
between unions and labour productivity have been eroded by greater competition and more 
emphasis on “partnership” in industrial relations but there is a lingering negative effect of 
multi-unionism, just as there is in Australia.  In Germany the weight of the evidence suggests 
that the information, consultation and voice role of works councils enhances labour 
productivity particularly in larger firms.  Finally, in Japan unions also tend to raise labour 
productivity via the longer job tenures in union workplaces which makes it more attractive to 
invest in human capital and through the unpaid personnel manager role played by full-time 
enterprise union officials in the workplace.  These results emphasise that there is no one 
generalised or average productivity effect of unions – it all depends on the quality of 
management and unions.  As decentralisation of bargaining spreads, so any union effects 
become more varied. 
Unions will reduce profits if they raise pay and/or lower productivity.  Unions might 
capture surplus profits in monopolistic or regulated sectors.  Alternatively they may siphon 
off returns which belong to sunk investments in physical capital or R&D, which would have 
serious consequences for the long run health of the union sector.  The evidence is pretty clear 
cut:  the bulk of studies show that profits or financial performance is inferior in unionised 
workplaces, firms and sectors than in their non-union counterparts.  This may, in turn, 
influence the rate of growth of employment and closures in union compared with non-union 
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firms and workplaces.  But the world may be changing.  A recent study of small USA 
entrepreneurial firms found a positive association between unions and profits and in the UK 
the outlawing of the closed shop, coupled with a lower incidence of multi-unionism has 
contributed to greater union-management cooperation such that recent studies find no 
association between unions and profits.  There is something of a paradox in this evidence.  In 
Japan and Germany, known for cooperative labour relations and proper employee voice, 
unions or works councils are linked to inferior financial performance.  By contrast, this 
traditional stylised fact – unions lower profits – may no longer hold in the UK and, possibly, 
the US.  This suggests that more intense product market competition inhibits unions’ ability 
to cream off (previous monopoly) profits.  To the extent that any union effects are weaker 
than previously, employees’ affinity with the union may also crumble, implying that unions’ 
survival may depend on them embracing a different – representational – role to their more 
traditional collective bargaining role. 
Unions can influence investment in physical capital both positively and negatively.  
Any positive effect occurs when the firm invests more to substitute away from expensive 
union labour.  The negative impact comes if a union delays the installation of new machinery 
or capture returns properly due to (sunk) investment.  North American and German evidence 
suggests that unionisation reduces investment by around one fifth compared with the 
investment rate in a non-union workplace.  In both Canada and the USA this effect is even 
felt at low levels of unionisation.  The UK evidence is mixed:  the most thorough study also 
finds that union recognition depresses investment, but this adverse effect is offset as density 
rises.  The exception is Japan where union recognition goes hand- in-hand with greater capital 
intensity. 
More detailed investigation of some issues shows:  the vital role of product market 
competition in both mediating and moderating any adverse union effects; that management-
union cooperation yields superior outcomes to adversarial relations; multi-unionism confers 
worse productivity or profitability than a single union or enterprise union; a union presence 
boosts investment in human capital, possibly offsetting any adverse impact on investment in 
physical capital; while German works councils, with their consultation/voice role, do raise 
productivity they also lower profits. 
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Table 1 
Industrial relations characteristics in our six countries, mid 1990s 
 
Characteristic USA Canada UK Germany Japan Australia 
 
Unionisation and collective bargaining 
1. Density % [rank] 
2. Coverage of collective bargaining % [rank] 
 
 
 
16 [18] 
18 [19] 
 
 
38 [8] 
36 [16] 
 
 
34 [10] 
47 [15] 
 
 
29 [13] 
92 [4] 
 
 
24 [16] 
21 [18] 
 
 
35 [9] 
80 [9] 
Bargaining level and coordination 
3. Bargaining level [rank] 
4. Coordination [rank] 
 
 
1 [16=] 
1 [16=] 
 
1 [16=] 
1 [16=] 
 
1.5 [14=] 
1 [16=] 
 
 
2 [5] 
3 [1=] 
 
1 [16=] 
3 [1=] 
 
1.5 [14=] 
1.5 [15] 
Standards and protection 
5. Labour standards index 
6. Employment protection legislation, 
stickiness index [rank] 
 
 
0 
0.7 [1] 
 
2 
1.1 [4] 
 
0 
0.9 [2] 
 
8 
2.6 [20] 
 
- 
2.3 [14] 
 
- 
1.2 [6] 
 
Notes and sources 
Rows 1 and 2.  % of employees who are union members or covered by collective bargaining, respectively.  Rank refers to rank out of 19 countries.  OECD, 
Employment Outlook 1997, Table 3.3. 
 
Row 3 refers to prevailing level of collective bargaining, ranging from 1 decentralised through 2 sector level to 3 centralised.  Rank refers to rank out of 19 countries.  
OECD Employment Outlook 1997, Table 3.3. 
 
Row 4 refers to the degree of coordination among employers and among unions, ranging from 1 uncoordinated to 3 coordinated.  Rank refers to rank out of 19 
countries.  OECD Employment Outlook 1997, Table 3.3. 
 
Row 5 is the aggregate score on 5 separate indices, each ranging from 0-2 (a higher score indicating greater protection) covering:  working time regulations; fixed-term 
contracts; employment protection; minimum wage protection; employee representation rights.  OECD Employment Outlook 1994, Table 4.8. 
 
Row 6 measures the stickiness of employment protection legislation for regular and temporary workers.  An average of 4 indices covering:  regular procedural 
inconveniences; notice and severance pay for no fault individual dismissal; difficulty of dismissal; regulation of collective dismissal.  Index runs from 0-6 on each 
indicator but there are few instances of numbers greater than 3.  High number means most sticky.  Rank refers to rank out of 27 countries.  OECD Employment 
Outlook 1999, Table 2.5. 
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Table 2 
Unions and productivity:  international evidence 
 
Country 
Author 
Sample Indicator of productivity Indicator of union Controls Results 
 
USA 
Black and Lynch 
(1997) 
 
627 mfc 
workplaces 1993 
(results 
confirmed in 
panel 1987-93) 
 
labour productivity 
(from Cobb-Douglas 
production function) 
 
recognition  
(plus interactions) 
 
IT (4 variables) 
human capital (3) 
high performance  
 work systems (7) 
profit sharing (2) 
 
 
cf base workplace (see text) 
· HPW + union  +20% 
· HPW + non-union  +11% 
· union + no employee 
involvement   -15% 
Canada 
Maki 
(1983) 
time series 
1926-78 
whole economy  
exc. agric 
total factor productivity  
growth 
density 
strike activity 
education 
cycle 
tfp growth 
(% points per year) 
density – 1.7 
strikes – 1.0 
during 1970s 
 
UK 
Pencavel  
(2001) 
 
1484 workplaces 
WERS 98 
 
 
compared with workplaces 
in same industry 
 % 
a lot better 12 
better 40 
average 43 
below average 5 
lot below average 1 
 
 
non union (597 workplaces) 
single union (322) 
multiple unions 
 joint barg. (337) 
multiple unions 
 separate barg. (228) 
 
workplace: size, age  
workforce: % PT, F 
  
difference between 
 union and 
non union 
workplaces 
separate 
and joint 
bargaining 
prob (a lot below ave) 
prob (below ave) 
prob (ave) 
prob (better than ave) 
prob (a lot better than 
ave) 
0 
0 
0 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0 
0.02 
0.06 
-0.05 
-0.03 
 
 
Germany 
Addison 
et al. (2000) 
 
1025 mfc 
workplaces 
Hanover Panel 
1994 
 
value added per employee 
 
 
works council 
Yes/No 
 
workplace: size, age 
 capacity utilisation 
workforce: education 
technology and work
 organisation 
profitsharing 
industry 
 
 
estabs 101-1000 employees 
 +, significant 
estabs 21-100 employees 
 +, ns 
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Table 2 (contd.) 
 
Country 
Author 
Sample Indicator of productivity Indicator of union Controls Results 
 
Japan 
Benson 
(1994) 
 
253 mfc firms 
employing 100+ 
in Kansai region 
1992 
 
rate the level of productivity 
in the co. compared with 
other firms in same industry. 
 % 
much higher 4 
little higher 34 
same 40 
little lower 20 
lot lower 2 
 
 
recognition 
density 
f.t. official present 
 
 
enterprise: size, K/L ratio 
workforce: % F, skilled, 
non-permanent 
mg: quality circle, JIT 
labour practices: 
communications, contingent 
 pay, other benefits  
product market: 
competitors, 
 expanding/contracting 
 
recognition –ve (ns) 
but 
f.f. official +vc (ns) 
 
 
 
Australia 
Crockett et al. 
(1992) 
 
 
759 private 
sector 
workplaces  
20+ e’ees 
AWIRS 1990 
 
 
 
compared with workplaces 
in same industry 
 % 
lot higher 11 
little higher 33 
same 42 
little lower 12 
lot lower 3 
 
 
 
recognition 
density 
no. of unions 
 
 
workplace: size, K/L ratio 
 capacity utilisation 
workforce: composition 
EI, labour turnover 
product market: competitors 
 expanding/contracting 
 
 
recognition –ve (sig at 10%) 
density –ve (sig at 10%) 
no. of unions –ve (sig at 5%) 
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Table 3 
Unions and financial performance: international evidence 
 
Country 
Author 
Sample Indicator of financial 
performance 
Indicator of union Controls Results 
 
USA 
Batt and 
Welbourne 
(2002) 
 
464 
entrepreneurial 
firms at IPO 
1993 
 
· Tobin’s q 
· change in earnings per 
share 
· change in stock price 
 
Recognition 
 
firm size, age 
industry 
region 
degree of risk 
 
Union firm has significantly higher: 
· Tobin’s q by 15% 
· earnings per share by 10% 
· stock price by 17% 
 
 
Japan 
Tachibanaki and 
Noda (2000) 
 
Panel of 12 
mfc inds 
1966-1984 
 
Labour’s share in income  
(wage payments 
 ÷ total  value added)  
 
Density 
Disputes 
· no. 
· workers involved 
· days lost 
 
K:L ratio 
K:O ratio 
CR 
firm size 
ave age of workforce 
% fe male, graduate 
 
+ sig association 
pre oil shock density, disputes and labour’s share 
 all rising 
post oil shock density, disputes and labour’s share 
 all falling 
eg 1966-1974 10% increase in no. of disputes 
 increases labour’s share by 0.9% (mean 38%) 
 
 
UK 
Wilkinson (2000) 
 
WERS 1998 
up to 1843 
workplaces 
 
4 ordered categories 
subjective 
 
recognition 
recognition by coverage 
bargaining level 
union strength 
 
workplace size, age 
% female, PT 
JCC, HRM score 
ESOS, incentive pay 
product market (9 variables) 
industry, region 
 
no association 
76 coefficients reported, only 4 significant 
result holds for 
· whole economy  
· trading sector 
· private trading sector 
· private trading sector with profit measure 
 
 
Germany 
Addison, 
Schnabel and 
Wagner (2001) 
 
Hanover Panel 
1994, 1996 
1,025 mfc plants 
in Lower 
Saxony, 
Germany 
 
5 ordered categories 
subjective 
· high profit dummy  
· index of profitability 
from 1 to 5 
 
 
 
Dummy variable for works 
council presence 
 
Establishment size, market 
share, capacity utilisation, 
state of production 
technology, profit sharing, 
industry dummies 
 
sig  - ve association 
· holds for both profit indicators and different 
sample sizes 
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Table 4 
Unions and investment: international evidence 
 
Country 
Author 
Sample Indicator of productivity Indicator of union Controls Results 
 
USA 
Hirsch (1990) 
 
 
315 firms 
data 1970-80 
 
investment rate 
 
 
density 
 
concentration ratio 
firm growth rate 
vintage 
industry import % 
 
unionisation reduced 
investment by 20% in the 
typical unionised firm 
 half effect directly 
 half effect via lower profits 
 
 
Canada 
Odgers and Betts (1997) 
 
 
18 mfc industries 
1967-1987 
 
investment rate 
 gross 
 net 
 
 
density 
 
strike activity 
import share 
accelerator 
cost of capital 
 
 
compared with non-union 
industry, one with average 
density reduces investment rate 
by: 
 gross 18-25% 
 net 66-74% 
 
 
UK 
Denny and Nickell 
(1992) 
 
73 3-digit mfc industries  
1980-84 
incorporating WIRS1 and 
WIRS2 data 
 
 
investment rate 
 
 
recognition 
density 
 
 
 
industry demand 
prices 
technical progress 
pay  
expected growth 
 
recognition –ve  
density +ve 
100% density not sufficient to 
offset recognition effect 
 
 
Japan 
Benson (1994) 
 
 
253 mfc firms employing 100+ 
in Kansai region 
 
 
 
Labour’s share in total costs 
Labour’s 
share % 
% of 
firms 
 <10 
 10-20 
 21-40 
 41-60 
 61+ 
 3 
 24 
 41 
 25 
 6 
 
 
 
recognition 
density 
f.t. official 
 
See table 1 
 
recognition associated with 
higher K-intensity: reduces 
[raises] probability of 
capitalisation rate less than 60% 
[above 60%] 
 
Germany 
Addison et al. (1993) 
101 mfc establishments in 
Niedersachsen and  
Baden-Württemberg 1990-91 
investment rate 
· gross 
· net 
work council present capacity utilisation 
firm size 
export: sales ratio 
hours of overtime 
product innovation 
presence of works councils 
lowers investment: 
· gross by 20-33% (sig) 
· net by 1-11% (ns) 
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Table 5 
Union recognition and workplace performance 
 
Indicator Sample Union indicator Control variables 
Union effect 
Probability of above average 
when union recognised 
 
Labour productivity 
compared with establishments 
in same industry 
 
 
WERS 1998 
trading sector 
1153 workplaces 
(25+ e’ees) 
 
 
recognition 
 
 
HRM (9 variables) 
% female 
% skilled 
private/public 
pay cf local LM 
workplace size 
industry 
 
 
 
whole sample  -4.5% 
1-5 competitors -14.0% 
6+ competitors  0.6%  
Quality of product service 
compared with establis hments 
in same industry 
 
as above 
1262 workplaces 
 
 
recognition 
 
as above 
 
whole sample  -8.5% 
1-5 competitors -8.5% 
6+ competitors  -6.6% 
 
Financial performance 
compared with establishments 
in same industry 
 
 
as above 
1195 workplaces 
 
recognition 
 
as above 
 
whole sample  -8.2% 
1-5 competitors -12.4% 
6+ competitors  7.4% 
 
 
Source: Metcalf (2003) 
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Table 6 
Workplace governance and performance 
 
 
Outcome 
HRM workplace, 
no union 
recognition 
Union 
recognition,  
no HRM 
HRM 
workplace 
with union 
recognition 
Marginal 
effect of 
partnership 
 
1. % with financial performance above-
average for industry 
 
2. % with labour productivity above 
average for industry 
 
3. % with labour productivity increased 
over past 5 years 
 
 
86 
 
 
75 
 
 
89 
 
 
40 
 
 
43 
 
 
73 
 
 
76 
 
 
70 
 
 
95 
 
 
 32.2* 
 
 
 31.7* 
 
 
 51.9** 
 
Source: 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, Management Questionnaire. Nationally 
representative sample of all workplaces with 10+ employees in trading sector. 
 
Notes: 
1. Outcomes 1-3 probit regressions.  Statistical analysis based on approximately 1300 workplaces. 
 
2. Outcomes 1-3 are from 5-point scale and refer to probability of the workplace being in the top two categories.  
For example 86% of managers in the HRM workplaces believe that their workplace has above average (for the 
industry) financial performance, compared with 40% for union workplaces and 45% for authoritarian 
workplaces. 
 
3. Definition of independent variables. 
HRM:  Formal strategic plan on human resources, with employee relations manager involved in formulation; 
personality or performance tests in recruitment, or recruitment based on skills, qualifications, experience and 
motivation only; most employees in largest occupational group trained in job other than their own; individual- 
or group-performance-related pay. 
Other controls:  Union recognition; joint consultative committee; employee involvement viz some form of 
financial involvement i.e. profit-related pay, employee share ownership or deferred profit-sharing, and either a 
quality circle or employee suggestion scheme; partnership viz union negotiates pay and management negotiates 
with, or consults union on recruitment, training, payment systems, handling grievances, staff planning, equal 
opportunities, health and safety and performance appraisals; collective dispute in previous year; variety in work 
of largest occupational group; growing market; more than half the workforce in managerial, professional or 
technical occupations; workplace under 10 years old; proportion of workers female; private sector; level of 
most recent pay increase compared with similar employees in locality; size of workplace and industry. 
 
4. Definition of benchmark workplaces. 
HRM:  No union recognition, all HRM variables and all other variables at weighted means. 
Union recognition:  Union recognition and all other variables at weighted means. 
 
5. Partnership:  We defined partnership as where union negotiates pay and management negotiates with, or 
consults  union on recruitment, training payment systems, handling grievances, staff planning, equal opportunities; 
health and safety and performance appraisals.  Such partnerships significantly raise the probability of above average 
performance on the financial performance, productivity level, productivity growth and relations between managers 
and workers.  They also lower the quit and absenteeism rates i.e. union recognition with partnership yields 
substantially better  economic and industrial relations outcomes than union recognition without partnership.  Related 
work also shows that such partnership arrangements yield better outcomes concerning the incidence of family 
friendly policies (e.g. paid parental leave, extended maternity leave) and equal opportunity policies (e.g. monitoring 
the composition of the workplace). 
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Table 7 
Unionisation and the incidence and intensity of training 
 
 Union compared with non-union 
1. Incidence %  Establishments providing training in 
the 12 months prior to survey 
Individuals receiving training in the 4 
weeks prior to survey 
 
  Manual 
  Non-manual 
 
 +17 
 +7 
 
 +1.6 
 +5.1 
 
2. Intensity Days provided per year Hours in previous week 
 
 Sample average Extra in union 
workplace 
Sample average Extra in union 
workplace 
 
  Manual 
  Non-manual 
 
2.1 
2.7 
 
+0.9 
+0.9 
 
0.6 
1.3 
 
0.17 
0.34 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Employer provision from nationally representative survey of 1693 workplaces (25+ employees) 
1990-91. 
2. Employee receipt from Labour Force Survey covering 60,000 employees, autumn 1993. 
3. Control variables:  % females, % part-time, % ethnic minority, % manual, public sector, skill 
shortage in establishment, fewe r than 5 competitors, single site establishment, establishment size, 
industry and region dummies. 
 
Source: Green, Machin and Wilkinson (1999). 
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